

1793

C O N T I N U I N G

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London :

PRINTED FOR J. OWEN, NO. 168, PICCADILLY, AND

V. GRIFFITHS, NO. 169, STRAND.

1795. 181

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THE affairs of Europe are now in a more lamentable situation than they have been at any time within the period of modern history. Never, since the irruptions of the Gothic nations, was there a conflict maintained with so much fury, and attended with such ruin and desolation, as distinguish the present war; and if we except the religious contests that distracted Europe during the dark ages, no other struggle has occasioned so many dissensions in society, and so much of that spirit of intolerance in matters of opinion which destroys the happiness of social life. The calamities which we have already felt from the war are few in comparison with those that may be reasonably apprehended, if his Majesty's ministers continue in power, and persist in their present measures; for the object of the war, as avowed by them at different times, and in various language, according to the exigencies of political prudence, does not permit us to indulge a hope that it can be completely terminated until one of the belligerent parties be conquered or destroyed. The objects of most of our former wars have been dominion, glory, commercial advantage, or the amusement of the prince; and the evils attending them were generally a dreadful slaughter of men, and a great waste of treasure; but

but the national existence was never in danger. To view the present conflict with the same indifference with which it was not uncommon to regard the progress of those wars, would be most stupid and absurd. It nearly concerns every man who is engaged in a contest that cannot end but in the destruction of his enemy or himself, to consider on which side the chance of safety lies; and it is strongly the duty of every Englishman to pause before he contributes his support to a war that puts in hazard every thing dear and valuable to him: he should calculate the worth of the object, and the probability of his attaining it, for which he risks the safety of those laws that secure to him so many blessings, and the existence of that grand fabric of wealth and power which has required so many ages of the painful and adventurous industry of his ancestors to rear, and so many hard struggles of their valour to defend.

Notwithstanding the late jesuitical evasions of the minister in explaining the object of the war, I believe it is still, as far as it exists in the wishes and intentions of the cabinet, the same which they had in view two years ago, and which the allies agreed upon at the treaty of Pilnitz; that is, the restoration of the ancient despotism of France. This object was fairly avowed by the ministers at the close of the last session of parliament, though subsequent events have made them alter their lofty tone.

All their declarations upon this point are marked with duplicity, inconsistency, treachery, and weakness. Every change of circumstances produced a change in their language; now adapted to the delusion of the people of England, and now to the credulity of that part of the people of France, who had the misfortune to place confidence in their professions.

At first the avowed object of the war was to protect our
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allies, and to repel an unjust and unprovoked aggression. A few victories contributed to the further delusion of the people, which encouraged ministers, after they had succeeded in their first object, to continue the war to obtain indemnification for the past, and security for the future. Stealing gradually towards an avowal of the grand design, their next pretended object, in consequence of the defection of Toulon, was to restore to France the constitution of 1789, and they adhered to their new promise as long as good faith appeared convenient.

They afterwards issued a declaration, in which they promised friendship, security, and protection, to all Frenchmen who would assist in the re-establishment of an hereditary monarchy in France; but they would not say a word about the constitution of 1789, nor would they specify any of the modifications of which a monarchical form of government might be susceptible. At length Mr. Pitt, encouraged by the acquiescence of parliament, and by the success of the artifices he had made use of to delude the people, boldly threw off the mask, and declared that nothing could satisfy himself and his colleagues, but the destruction of the jacobin government of France.

If we are to understand these words literally, M. Pitt's wishes have been already gratified; for the government of France is not at present, nor has it been for a considerable time, directed or influenced by any jacobin club or society. But since the war is still continued, we must suppose that the destruction of the jacobin societies that lately existed in France is not a good and sufficient destruction of the jacobin government: it must be the system of the French government that the ministers abhor, for the individuals who compose it have been changed so often, that we cannot well suppose they were all objectionable. But the system
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of the French government is founded upon the two great principles of national sovereignty, and universal suffrage. No man can impugn the first of these principles, without denying the right of his majesty to the throne, as it was established at the revolution. If therefore Mr. Pitt does not entertain treasonable opinions, it must be the destruction of the principle of universal suffrage that constitutes with him the main object of this dreadful war. It seems extraordinary, that the person who maintained a few years ago that this principle of government was necessary for the salvation of his country, should now insist that no calamity is too great to be endured for the advantage of rooting it out of the world. The minister's conduct on this occasion is a rare instance of enthusiasm in apostacy. Dissatisfied with the former demonstrations of his repentance, and disdaining all temperate loyalty, according to the new signification of the word, he plunges his country into the most desperate conflict it has ever encountered, to exterminate the disciples of his own doctrine, and to shew his new friends with what zeal he can abandon his principles. He will not easily extricate himself from this dilemma. His object is either attained, or it is most execrable, and never ought to be attained.

Considering then the destruction of liberty in France to be the real original object of the war, (and no doubt the present object, notwithstanding all the prevarications of ministers) I think the attainment of it would be the greatest misfortune that could befall this country.

We have seen the earnestness with which the princes of Europe have united to support the common interests of tyranny. If France were subdued, their union would be more powerful and more firm, when any of the tyrannical junto stood in danger from the just indignation of their subjects.

subjects. The people of every country would be narrowly watched, and being much separated, they could afford each other but little assistance. The other party would be compact, vigilant, and united, so that it would be almost a miracle if any struggle for liberty should be attended with success. Can we imagine that the constitution of England would be respected? The people of Poland, for attempting to establish a constitution less democratical than our own, have been robbed and murdered by princes professing the same object to justify their outrages, that our ministers have in view against France. The remains of freedom in England would be considered dangerous, as our language, and the events that pass amongst us are generally known over the continent. No country can be more justly accused of what her Russian majesty is pleased to call jacobinism, than England. We founded the American states, and inspired them with our former love of liberty, which they have communicated with increased fervour to their friends in the old world. Our constitution has been a constant theme of admiration to those authors whose writings have roused the French people from the lethargy of slavery, and terrified all the sovereigns of Europe. Those sincere friends to justice, virtue, and humanity could enjoy no repose while a constitution so pregnant with mischief as that of England existed, and they would therefore confederate for its destruction. Louis XVII. might prove an exception to the proverbial ingratitude of kings, by assisting to make one of his restorers as despotic as himself, and there is every reason to suppose he would have the good wishes, and perhaps the co-operation of that traitorous and tory faction, whose accursed influence has so long preponderated in the councils of this country.

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These calamities are only matter for speculation; for it is hardly possible that the event which might occasion them can ever take place: the misfortunes which threaten us are of a different nature.

Many of the ordinary evils of war afflict us now in a greater degree than in former wars, and some evils are peculiar to the present contest.

Our commerce never afforded so rich a prey to the enemy, and we have never of late years contended with an enemy from whom we could make fewer reprisals than from the French republic. More ships have been taken from us in the years 1793 and 1794, than we lost during the whole of the last war, or the war that preceded it. From this it arises, that the premium of insurance is so exorbitant, that the profits of that part of our commerce which has the good fortune to escape the enemy's activity, are nearly destroyed. Our commerce has also been greatly injured by the poverty of our foreign markets, owing to the general commotion, and the increased expences of foreign states, which have taken from their subjects the superfluity that enabled them to purchase our commodities. Every state in Europe has been impoverished by immense standing armies, and by the operation of the funding system. This appears from the extraordinary number of bankruptcies that have happened on the continent since the war.

By the war, the markets of France, Holland, and great part of Germany, Italy, and Spain, are lost to us entirely; and the value of the inhabitants of those countries with which we may still trade is greatly diminished to us in a commercial view. Taxes, and the destruction of property, wherever they take place, are injurious to a commercial people, who are candidates for as much of the property of every

every country as the inhabitants will spend. Every tax, every waste of an estate in Portugal, Spain, or Italy, diminishes the customers of England, and will be felt by the merchants of Leeds and Birmingham. The misfortunes of every part of the world are injurious to the commerce of this island, which is therefore interested not only to avoid war, on account of its own losses and expenditure, but even to prevent other countries from contending with each other, that they may not waste in war that property, of which great part would come into our possession if they remained at peace. England being the greatest commercial country in the world, is the barometer of its prosperity; and every great calamity that happens, in whatever part of the world, will affect us in proportion to the extent of our commerce.

The rapid fall in the prices of the public funds occasioned a great diminution of the trading capital of the country. For that portion of the funded debt which is usually circulated among merchants, may be considered as a trading capital, upon which an interest is paid. The three per cent. consolidated annuities were upwards of ninety-six before the alarm, which, in a view of this kind, ought to be looked upon as part of the war—as the prologue to the tragedy:—they are now at sixty-six, having fallen above thirty-six per cent. That part of the national debt which served as a trading capital has therefore been diminished in this proportion, and the diminution has been very sensibly felt in every branch of commerce. It cannot be said that the loss of capital has been supplied by the creation of a new debt, for on the contrary, the new loans have been drawn from commerce, and expended upon objects that yield no return.

The party feuds, occasioned by the principle of the war, exceed those of former times. Religion, as usual, has been enlisted into the quarrel. The destructive fanaticism of the deluded multitude; the persecutions of the government; the decay of commerce; and the melancholy aspect of our affairs in general, have given rise to an unexampled eagerness for emigration. The burdens of the people, which are increased sufficiently by the expences of the war, must be increased still farther, as the number of those who are to bear them is diminished. To estimate the loss we sustain from the present emigrations only by the number of the emigrants, would be to make it considerably below the truth. They do not consist, as formerly, of needy adventurers, but of respectable men, possessed of property, and acquainted with agriculture, commerce, and manufactures; they take from us their art, industry, and capital, and carry them to a country where there exists no harpy government to seize upon the fruits of their labour, and stigmatize them as traitors for complaining of the robbery—to a country blessed with peace and freedom, where nature in her loveliest form presents inexhaustible treasures of fertility to all who desire to possess them; where the wisdom and virtue of man combine with the bounty of nature, to promote the happiness of those who make this delightful land their asylum; where government is founded upon the basis of liberty and truth, and where it is demonstrated in practice, that universal political emancipation is not incompatible with the strictest preservation of the social order; where, to sum up all, it appears likely that human nature will attain to a degree of perfection that has hitherto existed only in the imaginations of poets and philosophers.

Many parts of the British empire are so circumstanced, that, far from being able to afford us any assistance in the
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moment of danger, it might require a considerable force to protect them from the enemy, or subdue them into obedience, at a time when all our exertions might be necessary for our own preservation.

The people of Scotland may not have forgotten the court of justiciary, nor their brave and virtuous countrymen, the assertors of their rights, whom that tribunal has condemned to an ignominious exile. The Scotch are too inquisitive, and too well informed, to be unconcerned or ignorant of the present event, and they are said to be strongly disaffected to the measures of administration, and to feel a portion of their ancient national pride, and a strong desire to recover their ancient independence.

Of the state of Ireland, it is difficult to speak with precision. Enough, however, has happened to prove that the corruption of the legislature of that country may not always ensure to his majesty the allegiance of its people. It is true that their conduct on a late occasion was abject, and must have filled every person who entertained a regard for the Irish character with shame and indignation. But a time may come when they will assert their rights by other means, than by petitions and mourning: if the Catholic body be emancipated, the Irish nation will contain but one people and one party, and their demands will be irresistible. If government refuse the emancipation, the catholics, aided by the republican dissenters, and perhaps by the enemy, will attempt a separation, which would be a death-blow to the British empire. Ireland supplies the navy with provisions, and the army and the navy with men; she has given during this war more than 150,000 soldiers and sailors to his majesty's service. When this immense resource is lost, recruits must be found among tradesmen and manufacturers; but if they are taken from their employments, the regular means of supporting government will be greatly diminished. Were the ports of
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the Irish channel in the possession of the enemy, our homeward-bound merchant ships would require the protection of strong convoys, or be obliged to risk the dangers of the north passage, and perhaps of Dutch privateers. I need not mention the quantity of English property that would be confiscated, nor the alarming impression that another republican revolution might make upon the minds of the English people. It is certain that our American colonies bear no very strong affection to the mother country. Some of them have been abandoned by ministers to their own feebleness, or the caprice of the enemy. Others are disgusted by the imperious conduct of the persons whom his majesty has entrusted to govern them. They are in the neighbourhood of a powerful nation, that has every motive arising from interest, and the recollection of former injuries, to prevent it from being scrupulous about availing itself, though unjustly, of the misfortunes of the British empire, and taking possession of part of its territories, in a general scramble. These countries, if they were obliged to make an election, might think it prudent to join the strongest party, and they might conceive themselves in a better situation as independant states of a rising republic, than unprotected colonies of a falling monarchy.

The decree of the national convention for abolishing slavery, has caused a great alarm throughout all our West-Indian possessions. The cruelty of the planters, and the ferocious dispositions of the slaves, and the immense disproportion between the numbers of the blacks and whites, would at any time render a great deal of watchfulness necessary to preserve these colonies; and if, besides these circumstances, a small portion of their wonted energy and success should attend the operations of the enemy in this quarter of the world, our empire in it is lost.

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Our affairs in the East-Indies are not so unfavourable. It remains, however, to be known, what part the Dutch settlements will take in the contest. We have in India an inveterate enemy, who would not fail to seize the least advantage that our distresses, or the power of the French, might afford him, in hopes of retrieving his reputation and his dominions.

When so much danger and disaffection exists in the distant parts of his majesty's dominions, how impolitic must it be to continue a war that requires the united efforts of the whole empire to give us any chance of success?

In a contest, on which not only the wealth, but the existence of the country, are at stake, and which government (it should seem) mean to continue until they either accomplish their purpose, or perish in the attempt, the justice of our cause should be of the clearest kind. But unfortunately their objects are as destitute of justice, as their operations of vigour,

When the French commenced hostilities against this country, both the forms and the substance of justice were on their side. In point of form they were justified by the dismissal of their ambassador, Chauvelin; an insult considered most aggravating among nations, and precisely specified in the commercial treaty between France and England, as an act equivalent to a rupture. But it was evident long before this time, from the speeches of ministers, the industry exerted by them to inflame the minds of the people and revive their dormant antipathies to France, the abuse lavished upon that nation by persons and publications notoriously in the pay of government, and the conduct of the Elector of Hanover from the beginning of the revolution, that the court of St James's would take the first favourable opportunity to join the enemies of France. If the persons
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who then governed that country had tamely submitted to all these insults and outrages, and given time to the British government to meditate and prepare in security a blow, decisive perhaps against the liberties of the new republic, they would have deserved, as traitors, that death which they afterwards most unjustly suffered.

The decrees of fraternity, the opening of the Scheldt, and the spirit of aggrandizement of France, did not justify the hostile conduct of this court; for no attempt was made to remove those causes of complaint by negotiation. Besides his majesty had often evinced his royal displeasure at the republic, long before they existed.

Whatever doubts may be entertained of the justice of the cause of France at the commencement of the war, I fear there can be now but one opinion, and that one not very favourable to the honour of our country.

From the manifestoes, letters, and proclamations of the allies, and their ministers, we may know the conduct they would pursue if they were completely successful. One of their first measures would probably be to partition among themselves a considerable part of the dominions of France, Condè and Valenciennes were taken possession of by the Emperor in his own name, and Mr. Pitt used as little ceremony with the French colonies in the East and West-Indies. From Lord Auckland's letter to the States General, when some members of the National Convention were made prisoners, it appears that all those who had taken an active part in the revolution would be tried as rebels; the property that formerly belonged to the emigrants, the clergy, and the crown, (two thirds of the whole landed property of France) would be restored to them, and the present holders, who have paid for it, and whose titles are sanctioned by the highest possible authority, the judgments of competent

competent tribunals, and the decrees of a sovereign power, would be robbed. Every motive that can induce a spirited nation to make a vigorous resistance to oppression, must now operate to inflame the anger, and fortify the resolution of the French. An enemy assails them, threatening to conquer their territories, to plunder and murder their people, and to force upon those whom they suffer to live, a government which they abhor, and a religion which they despise and abhor. Let all the causes that have ever been held to justify wars be put together, and I do not know that it is in the power of the imagination, aggravating those causes to the highest pitch, to conceive the situation of a country waging hostilities with greater justice than belongs at this time to the cause of France.

The resources of this country are represented to be in a flourishing condition. Our commerce is certainly, notwithstanding all losses and impediments, rich and extensive; our manufactures are numerous, and superior in general to those of the same kind in other countries: but we have nothing to depend upon besides our manufactures and commerce. The produce of the soil is insufficient to support the inhabitants. It could not, therefore, contribute to extraordinary expences. Its resources are precarious; they are diminished in a much greater degree by war, than the resources afforded by agriculture; and the loss of one battle at sea might destroy them, or (what would have the same effect for a considerable time on the operations of government) the confidence of the public in their greatness and stability.

To those who never condescend to visit the habitations of the poor, or listen to their murmurs, it may seem, that the burden occasioned by the public debt, and the extravagance

gance of government, is chearfully borne; but the truth is, that it causes great distress and loud complaints. Let not the advocates of the war rashly conclude, from the former patience of the people, that they are capable of supporting any burden, or willing to support a burden a little greater than what they now endure.

When we view the situation, and the resources of the French republic, we are presented with one of the grandest spectacles that ever offered itself to human contemplation: a whole people rising up as a man, at the call of their country in danger, encountering and defeating all the armies and generals of reputation in Europe; pursuing every object with a degree of activity and perseverance unparalleled in the history of the world; sacrificing all the conveniences of life, and disregarding the rigours of climate and seasons, unless to make them subservient to their ambition.

The resources of France are not inferior to the heroism of her people. There is not a prince in Europe whose authority is equal to that of the National Convention: in every thing that relates to the defence of the country, it exercises an unlimited power; and however it has been distracted by its own factions, it has never been abated in the energy of its operations against the common enemy. Men, money, ships, provisions, are put in requisition, when the exigencies of the republic demand them, and they cannot be otherwise obtained. More than a million of soldiers obey the orders of the Committee of Public Safety; and the same number of persons are employed in the manufacture of saltpetre, and the fabrication of arms.

In the midst of tumults, factions, and military preparations, the utmost attention is paid to agriculture and to all the arts and sciences that contribute to improve the art of war. In short, the whole labour of the country, beyond
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what is sufficient to support the people, is either directly or indirectly, in the service of the government.

To keep this mighty machine in motion evidently requires vast pecuniary resources, in which the French have unfortunately the advantage over all the allies.

These resources consist of gold and silver to the amount of 20 millions sterling, arising from the church plate, the crown plate, donations of individuals, but chiefly from the operation of the decree, made in the reign of Robespierre, which confiscated to the use of the republic all the gold, silver, and jewels, that should be discovered buried in the earth, or concealed in any secret place. Most of the treasure of the country was at that time concealed, and the owners, knowing that they would lose it, and perhaps be treated as suspected persons if it were discovered, thought proper to exchange it for assignats. With part of this sum the state manages its foreign commerce, and purchases provisions for their armies in the territory of their enemies.—But the great financial resource of the republic (compared with which their species is trifling) is their paper currency, supported by two thirds of the landed property and by considerable taxes.

When ministers speak of the French finances, they avail themselves of a species of misrepresentation in which it is extraordinary they are not always detected. They expatiate on the great depreciation of the assignats, particularly on that which has taken place since the death of Robespierre: yet when they state to parliament any expenditure of France they represent it (in British money) as if the assignats were at par, and exult at the seeming extravagance which is the necessary effect of the depreciation.—For instance: when assignats are 50 per cent below par, it is evident that one million sterling would go as far in

France as two millions of assignats. Lord Grenville, Lord Mornington and Mr. Pitt, would then declare that the credit of the republic was in a most unsound and ruinous situation, their paper money being worth no more than half the nominal value. If they noticed some article of expence which had cost the French, suppose 48 millions of livres, or 2 millions of pounds, (no more in effect than one million sterling according to the given depreciation) they would assert it was impossible, that a government which expended 2 millions sterling on such an occasion, could continue the War another campaign. And they would then boast of their own extravagance as œconomy and moderation. When they wish to represent the French republic on the verge of bankruptcy and ruin, they state sometimes with exaggeration, and sometimes, with fidelity, the depreciation of the assignats. When they wish to represent France as burdened with enormous debts, and carrying on the War at an expence, which it is not possible for any nation to bear long, they take the assignats at par, and state the debts and expences in sterling money. If these gentlemen make use of the depreciation of the assignats as an Argument against the credit and stability of the French government, they ought in fairness, to state their debts and expenditure according to that depreciation. If on the other hand they state those debts and expences without making any abatement on account of the depreciation, they ought to give the French government credit for having their assignats at par.

Though this latter mode would allow them a credit which they do not possess, the advantage in men's opinions would be overbalanced by the imputation of extravagance. The debts and expences of France being incurred in paper-money, ought to be estimated according to its value, that is
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according to its depreciation; and it will then appear that the debts and expences of France are not so enormous, as ministers represent.

The report of Cambon, made on the 22d of January, 1795; states that France has expended in four years and a half 222 millions sterling in assignats more than would have been expended if the old government had continued, and there had been no War. At whatever rate these assignats were issued (most of them no doubt, greatly under par) they must now be valued according to the present depreciation. Mr. Pitt and Cambon agree in stating that assignats now lose 85 per cent; that is, that 100 livres in assignats are worth no more than 15 livres in silver; at this rate the 222 millions are no more in fact than about 33 millions of our money. The whole expenditure of France during the War, has been 260 millions sterling, the paper currency being supposed at par. But by the depreciation of 85 per cent, this sum is reduced to something less than 40 millions sterling. The whole expenditure of the month from September 22, to October 22, 1794; was 243,518,730 livres, upwards of 10 millions sterling, and the depreciation of assignats at this time, was about 75 per cent. These 10 millions were therefore equivalent to no more than two millions and a half. Taking this sum as the average actual expenditure of the different months of the year 1795, the expenditure for that year will amount to 30 millions sterling. The receipts from the same month were 43,058,507 of livres, about 21 millions sterling per annum; and at the above rate of depreciation upwards of four millions sterling. The deficiency, or the debt for one year, will therefore, be no more than 26 millions of our money; no extravagant sum considering the greatness of French operations. If from the whole sum expended by the
enemy

enemy during the war, be deducted the financial advantages which they will not fail to draw from the multitude of their conquests, particularly the conquest of Holland, we shall have no reason to flatter ourselves with hopes of the speedy ruin of the finances of France.

The whole amount of the assignats in circulation at the beginning of the year was 6,500 millions of livres, about 42 millions sterling, at the present discount. Therefore 42 millions sterling in money or in property of any kind would now pay the whole of the floating debt of France, provided that the holders of assignats were obliged to accept of payment for them at this depreciation.

Whatever inconveniencies the French government may feel from the depreciation of their paper currency, the French nation will at the end of the war be easily liberated by the depreciation, from the load of debt which might oppress them for a century, if contracted in the ordinary manner. It cannot be supposed that all the holders of assignats will ever be paid at par. To reimburse them in this manner will be impossible; for where can France procure 271 millions sterling in money, or property to that amount? If it were possible, it would be unjust. The greater number of the holders of assignats will have received them at their present depreciated value, and they cannot expect to be paid by the state more than they have given for them. If upon the establishment of peace, all the assignats were to be redeemed by the nation at par, a multitude of persons, instead of bearing their just portion of the public burden, would derive enormous wealth out of the public calamity; a man would be taxed to pay another the full value for an assignat which he himself might have sold a few weeks before for one sixth of that value. The people would groan for ages in misery, to support in idleness

dileneſs and luxury a troop of ſtock-jobbers and contractors. Fortunately for the French, their legislative aſſembly does not ſwarm with ſtock-jobbers and contractors, and they are therefore in no great danger of enduring ſuch injuſtice. It is probable that the paper-money that may remain in circulation at the end of the war, will be redeemed, either by the ſale of national property or otherwiſe, at a fixed price, which may be ſomething above the market price at that time. The national debt of France would then be ſpeedily liquidated, and the people would ſoon have the full enjoyment of peace, unalloyed and unincumbered with the enormous burden ariſing from the funding ſyſtem, which almoſt eternizes the calamities of war.

It muſt be acknowledged that the advantages gained in this manner by the ſtate have been purchaſed by the ſufferings and loſſes of many individuals, but theſe loſſes muſt have been ſuſtained at any rate. 260 millions ſterling (nominally) have been expended during the war; ſome of this money was iſſued at par, and a great deal of it much below that rate. Suppoſe on an average of the whole, that the real ſum expended was 200 millions, which has now by the depreciation fallen to 40 millions; the holders of assignats, that is, the whole nation, have loſt by the depreciation 160 millions ſterling. But it was neceſſary to raiſe the ſum of 200 millions to ſupport the war and the revolution; and this ſum (unleſs for the creation of the paper-money) muſt have been either raiſed by enormous taxes, or borrowed at an enormous rate of intereſt, proportioned to the various fortunes of the republic. To have raiſed the whole ſum by taxes, would have been a much greater grievance to the people than what they have ſuffered
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by the depreciation, on account of the difficulty and expence of collecting large taxes. It is therefore better for the French, by the difference of this difficulty and expence, to sink 160 millions by depreciation, than to pay to their government that sum by taxation. It is also better for them that they have sunk at once 160 millions by depreciation, than that they should have paid an enormous interest for that sum by taxation; for though in the latter case they might not have paid so much, even including the expence of collection, they would still have had to discharge the capital, which would have remained after the war a heavy burden upon themselves and their posterity.

The depreciation is a tax upon the people, and perhaps the most fair and advantageous one that could have been imposed on a great emergency. The cost of collecting it is trifling, being only the expence of the fabrication of assignats. Whatever it produces comes without farther diminution into the public treasury. The burden of it upon the citizens is in proportion to the quantity of assignats that they possess; and the quantity of money that a man possesses is as good a criterion of his ability to contribute to the support of the state, as any other that can be applied to in a free country; certainly a much better criterion than the rent of his house, or the number of its windows. This tax falls most heavily upon bankers, rich men, and all those who have a fixed revenue arising out of lands, or any other species of property; that is, upon the persons who ought to be heavily taxed, when heavy taxes are unavoidable. The depreciation is less felt by tradesmen, manufacturers, and all who live by the wages of labour, and the sale of the produce of the earth; for labour and the produce of the earth will always bring their just price, provided

provided there are no maximum laws. The industrious classes are therefore less burdened than any other, by the tax of depreciation.

Mr. Pitt has asserted, I think without truth, that the system of moderation lately adopted in France is injurious to the credit of the assignats, and that, Robespierre's maximum laws supported by means of terror, gave additional value to them, and consequently additional energy to the government. By these laws, the government partly supported itself, not by the contributions of the whole nation, but by robbing individuals. When the French government issue assignats at the market price, the tax of the depreciation is paid by the people, and the individuals who have dealings with the government pay no more of this tax than their just share. But if the government issue their assignats at par, the depreciation being at the time, suppose 50 per cent, and force an individual to sell his corn or his ship, and to take in return these assignats at a par price, the individual is robbed of one half his property, besides paying as well as others his quota towards the public taxes. By the maximum laws, farmers, tradesmen, labourers, manufacturers, in short all the useful and industrious classes, were robbed to support the rich and lazy, of so much as the maximum prices of their labour and produce fell short of the true prices. This difference often amounted to half the value of the commodity.

Persons of fortune, whose incomes through the operation of the maximum laws, were not affected by the depreciation, paid little or no part of that tax, which fell altogether upon the poor and industrious. Thus the true order of taxation was reversed. Those who were taxed lightly ought to have been taxed heavily, and those who were taxed heavily, ought to have been taxed as lightly as the exigencies of the public would admit. The
maximum

maximum laws heaped favors upon the rich, and plundered the poor. They paid court to an orderly class of men, who could not in any case have been very dangerous to government, and they oppressed and irritated a numerous and licentious class, who had the power, and had often shewn they did not want the inclination to redress their grievances, and punish the authors of them, by insurrection. The maximum laws so far from giving energy and stability to the government of Robespierre, were among the principle causes of his destruction. To support this part of his dreadful system, required perpetual executions, for which he was abhorred and abandoned by the people.

The maximum laws were as injurious to the true credit of the paper currency, for whose support they were enacted, as to the safety of the government. Like the old laws, which inflicted heavy penalties for taking interest for money, they defeated their own purpose. They attached chiefly upon the necessaries of life, or in the French phrase, upon articles of the first necessity; but though they affixed the highest prices that could be demanded for them (prices greatly below the true value) they did not in many instances oblige the owners to sell them, and the owners would naturally wish to keep them back from the market as long as possible, since they would sustain a great loss by selling them. But as the maximum laws were enacted in times of scarcity, there was always a great demand for the maximum articles. The demand for food on the one hand, and the eager desire of gain on the other, would cause the law of the maximum to be disregarded, notwithstanding the heavy penalties it imposed. Enormous prices would be given to the seller of provisions; for he would require not only a just equivalent in assignats for his commodities; that is,

the

the price they would bring, if no maximum laws existed, but he must be handsomely paid for the great risk he incurred by an illegal transaction. Assignats would in this manner be depreciated by the maximum laws, for it would require a larger sum in that money to purchase a given article, than if no maximum laws had been enacted.

One of the causes that give credit and currency to the French assignats is the demand for them as instruments of commerce, but for this purpose they must be allowed to find their true value. They must not, by obtaining from the legislature a forced credit, become the instruments of public robbery and private injustice. When the difference between the maximum prices, and the just prices becomes very great, as it must soon, in consequence of the encreasing quantity of paper money, all affairs of commerce, will be transacted either without regard to the maximum law by means of the assignats, which, must be depreciated, by such transactions, or by barter, or by specie, by which the demand for the assignats, as a medium of traffic, and consequently their value will be diminished.

It is not cruelty and terror, but justice and moderation, that will support the finances of France. When the government is just and moderate, the people have confidence in them, and they take more willingly the money, which they create. Had the system of terror and the maximum laws been continued, their influence would have been as ruinous to the paper currency as to every thing else within their reach. They have injured the sale of the national domains; for what man would give a large price for land, when he knew, he might be lawfully plundered of its produce: they have nearly destroyed many branches of commerce and manufactures; for who would engage in

them, when forbid on pain of death to make any profit of his capital, and when all unprohibited commerce was mitigated robbery?

The depreciation of the assignats, great as it has been, is not so detrimental to the French government as his majesty's ministers suppose. The assignats were made for two purposes: to serve as an instrument of commerce, and as a medium by which the government were enabled to command a portion of the produce and industry of the country. With respect to commerce, it is not of so much consequence that the assignats should bear a high value, as a certain value; for that which is to represent the value of all things should be the least liable to vary. The revolutions in the government, and the events of the war, caused a fluctuation in the price of assignats that did much injury to commerce; but the government, who were always struggling for their existence, did not give themselves much uneasiness about the embarrassments of merchants. With respect to the government, the depreciation was not so severely felt: in some cases it matters not to them how much it may be.

The circumstances that give strength to a paper currency like the French assignats, are the public opinion of the stability of the government, or of the system of government, the pledges offered in exchange for them, the debts and the taxes which may be paid by them, and the demand for them as instruments of commerce. The people of France have never been in less dread of a counter-revolution than at present. The greater part of the territory of the whole republic is the pledge of the assignats; and with regard to the sale of that part of it which has not been disposed of, it signifies little whether
one

one livre in silver will purchase two or twenty livres in assignats. The land will sell for its real value. What would bring one livre when they are at par, would sell for two, when the depreciation is 50 per cent. When the state is obliged from depreciation of its currency to pay double (nominally) for the services of its citizens, it receives from them a proportionable price for whatever it sells to them. If the national property is considerable enough to defray all the public expences, the nation can suffer nothing from the utmost possible depreciation of its currency.

The same observations hold with respect to taxes. If the assignats fall gradually to one half, or one fourth of this nominal value, the taxes may be nominally doubled or quadrupled, without imposing any additional burden upon the people. The principal alteration that the depreciation would then produce, would be an emission of a greater quantity of paper, or a change in the denomination of the notes.

The case in which the government cannot be injured by any depreciation is when the quantity in value of the paper money issued is not greater than the value received in taxes, and in payment for national property.

If the depreciation be great and rapid, and if the quantity emitted be enormously greater than that which is destroyed by taxes and other means, the government will be much embarrassed. That the French government will soon be in this situation appears probable. Their immense armies—the myriads whom they employ to provide them with arms and provisions—the gigantic scale of all their operations—their extravagance in many instances—and in some, their embezzlements of the public money, (for they are
not

not ignorant of the practices of politer governments) have required such an immense emission of assignats, that even their immense resources have been insufficient to keep them down. Were we contending with a government that relied upon regular resources only, we might consider this circumstance as an advantage; but since our object is the destruction of a form of government to which the people are enthusiastically attached, and for whose support they are ready to make every sacrifice, we cannot expect that any financial difficulties will make them surrender, while men and money can be obtained by any means. If the depreciation of the assignats should ever become so great as to make them of little or no value, there are many expedients to which the government may have recourse. The church and crown lands, and the greater part of the property of the emigrants, have been already sold, but the purchasers did not pay immediately. In general the price was divided into twelve parts, to be paid at twelve annual instalments, with interest. The principal sales took place since the year 1790, and many of them since the dethronement of the king in 1792; the convention have therefore to receive yet from eight to ten instalments upon their immense property, according to the time of the sale; and this income will withdraw from circulation a great quantity of assignats, and therefore increase the value of the remainder. But as these domains were sold for a specific sum in assignats, the subsequent depreciation of them makes the sale injurious to the nation, and beneficial to the purchasers: that which was a fair price when assignats bore a high value, may be at this time too small by one half. If the convention is hard pushed, the purchasers may be told, that the spirit of the contract must be observed, and that they must

must add to all future payments, such a sum in assignats beyond that which was agreed upon, as will compensate the republic for the depreciation since the time of the sale.

If the purchasers dislike this arrangement, the assignats already paid by them to the nation will probably be returned with interest, and an allowance for the depreciation, and the lands put up to auction anew. Should even this expedient be insufficient, the French government may have recourse to the measure which they adopted on the 14th of December, 1793, that no assignat above a certain value should be received at the treasury, after a certain time. If pushed still farther, they might make a similar decree with regard to the whole currency; the effect of which would be, that all national property sold in the mean time would bring an immense nominal price, and the finances would be completely liberated. If the convention was driven to the utmost extremity, they might declare all the assignats already in circulation waste paper, make a new emission, and open a new account. Much distress would be occasioned by this measure, and many complaints, which would probably be soon overcome by the energy of the government, and the enthusiasm of the people. If we may judge from experience, there is no evil which the French nation will not endure, no sacrifice which they will not make, rather than submit to the scourges of despotism and superstition.

Among the expedients for withdrawing from circulation a quantity of assignats, none appears more ingenious, or more feasible than the lottery of Cambon. If the scheme be carried into effect, it will prevent any dangerous embarrassment in the French finances for a few years at least.

If

If we contended with France, as formerly, only for wealth and dominion, the embarrassments of her finances might probably terminate the war in our favour; but we fight to subvert the whole system of her government, and we have ample proof that we cannot succeed without subduing the country. We have also strong proof that the people of it will make every sacrifice, contribution and exertion, rather than submit to any conqueror. When, therefore, it is proposed to examine how long they are able to hold out, and continue the war, we should lay aside financial considerations, and consider how long will the whole produce and industry of the country be sufficient to feed the people, and support the government. The assignats are only the medium for transferring the surplus produce and industry into the hands of government. Whatever derangements and imbezlements there may be in this currency, neither produce nor industry will be destroyed by them. The government will soon find means of getting at both; and they never will abandon their struggle for liberty, while France yields corn, meat, and cloaths enough for the inhabitants, and arms and ammunition enough for that part of them destined to act against the enemy. It matters not whether all these things are produced in France, or whether some of them are purchased from foreign countries.

That the whole produce and industry of France will be sufficient to feed the people, and maintain the government, even on its present immense establishment, for any length of time to which the war can be prolonged, is extremely probable. They have answered these purposes completely, ever since the war began, without having been called for with that rigour with which they would be exacted

acted in the extremity of distress. Though the government has accumulated a great debt, and mortgaged a great portion of revenue, they have not borrowed any money, or the value of money, from any foreign state, which must have been the case, if more than the whole produce of France had been consumed by the people and the government. On the contrary, they are said to have lavished immense sums in certain countries.

Nothing is more improbable, than that the produce of France, for the next eight or ten years, will fall short of what it has been lately, or even at the most flourishing periods of the monarchy. The agricultural wealth of France was always superior to that which arose from her manufactures and commerce. It is directly the reverse with respect to England. Our commerce, and our manufactures, which in a great measure depend upon our commerce, form the chief part of our wealth. The commercial and manufacturing interests of France have suffered extremely by the war; but the agriculture of that country has been improved; every possible encouragement is given to it by the government. New modes of cultivation are struck out; machines invented to facilitate labour; the public roads improved; canals formed; and those immense portions of the earth that under the old government were rendered useless by pride and ostentation, made profitable to the state. To give efficacy to these improvements, commissioners are sent into every part of the republic, whose knowledge and authority overcome the ignorance and prejudices of the peasants. Notwithstanding the great scarcity which is owing in a great measure to the maximum laws, the insurrections in different parts of the country, and the foolish and oppressive conduct of government to cultivators of corn, it is known that France has
never

never produced more abundant harvests than since the revolution; and it is probable from the events of the war, that the produce will not decrease.

Let us therefore banish from our minds the delusive hope of conquering France by her financial difficulties, or of obliging her to remit any of her claims to freedom by the power of our money. Admit that we have treasure without end; France is equally rich in the fertility of her soil, and the enthusiasm of her people. We shall never be able to weary her from the pursuit of independence, while she has men to fight, and food to support them; and if her enthusiasm remains (as it probably will) while the war lasts, her produce will enable her to continue hostilities, even on the present gigantic scale of operations, for five, twenty, or a hundred years.

Let it be supposed then, that the success of the two next campaigns should fully gratify the hopes of the most sanguine friend of administration—that the enemy should be driven from Germany, Holland, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain, and that the allies should be again in possession of Valenciennes, Condé, Landrecies, and Quesnoy; we should not even then be nearer the attainment of the grand object of ministers than at present. New assignats would be created—fresh soldiers would fly to the frontiers—fresh enthusiasm and fury would urge them to battle—and the armies of the allies would, as usual, either be cut to pieces, or forced to save themselves by flight. In the mean time, the irritation of the public mind in France might occasion new parties, revolutions, and massacres; and all the advantages that would arise from such slaughter, would be that the increased miseries of that brave country might afford a new subject of exultation to those gentlemen who are not ashamed

ed to maintain that they are contending in the cause of religion, humanity, and justice.

We may conceive the efforts that France could make for a great length of time without having recourse to vigorous exactions, by attending to the events of the reign of Louis XIV. That monarch was able to carry on expensive wars, and maintain three or four hundred thousand men in the field during fifteen years, although the whole produce of France must have been greatly inferior to its present amount for obvious reasons, and although the nation was not then incumbered with the maintenance of 250,000 dissolute clergy and nobility, their equipages, servants, and dependants. The whole number of these idlers could not have been much less than a million, and they were probably more expensive to the nation than the same number of troops would have been. At present there are neither nobility or clergy supported in idleness; splendid equipages are abolished; and every citizen must either fight or work. The surplus produce that would have supported this million of persons, had the old government continued, will now be more than sufficient to support a million of soldiers.

We have perhaps as little to hope in regard to the attainment of our object, from the assistance of the royalists in France, as from the state of her pecuniary resources. When this party were in their utmost strength and prosperity, we were unable to derive any benefit from their co-operation; they have been since broken by numerous defeats. The effect of the decree of amnesty upon those who escaped is notorious; and it is not to be expected, from the specimen they have had of the tempers of the French and English governments, that they will again encounter the energy and fury of the one, or place any reliance upon the imbecillity and irresolution of the other.

The expectation of counter-revolutionary insurrections in Paris, or the department, we have found to be delusive. The objects of all the revolutions and insurrections that have happened in different parts of the republic, (La Vendee alone excepted) were essentially different from that which his majesty's ministers have avowed: in general, each revolution has removed the government farther from monarchy than the preceding. Such was the force of the popular aversion to royalism, that whenever a party could fix the imputation of it upon its adversaries, it generally destroyed their credit and their existence. Nor does the public opinion upon this subject seem to have varied since the death of Robespierre. It was asserted in one of the prints, that the son of Louis XVI. would derive advantage from the late triumph of the moderate party. The Committee of General Safety were so much alarmed at the assertion, that they contradicted it as a calumny in a formal manner, and disclaimed (as they said) all intention of mitigating the captivity of the children of Capet. The circumstance is atrocious, but it shews in the strongest manner the opinion that government entertained of the feelings of the public: they must have supposed that their detestation of royalty was deep and inveterate, when they dreaded the imputation of an act of humanity to infants, because they were the offspring of a king. The committee might have been mistaken, but it is not probable they were; for they had the best means of knowing the truth, and the safety of their lives might depend upon the accuracy of their information. (a)

No

a. The substance of the paragraph complained of to the Convention was, that the prisoners in the temple would be among the number of those who would be benefited by the destruction of the Terrorists, and that the Committee

No expedients are neglected to preserve the French nation in their present fierce and republican temper. The exploits of the meanest soldier, are resounded through the country. Ample rewards are bestowed upon him, and his family maintained at the public expence, if the fate of war should deprive them of his protection. Infants are taught to lip ejaculations for the prosperity of the republic. The reigning principles of liberty and equality are instilled with the utmost care into the minds of youth, and become their prejudice and habit. The religious opinions supposed to be the most grateful to the pride of human reason, are so interwoven as to be almost identified with those principles, and are celebrated at public festivals with all the graces and magnificence that decorated the elegant superstitions of Greece and Rome. It is by these artifices that the rising generation will become as terrible and determined republicans as their fathers.

All history teaches us that the object of our pursuit is fruitless. Wars made against opinions have only served to give them strength and enthusiasm. There is hardly an instance of a popular revolution that was tolerably successful in the beginning, being afterwards defeated by foreign force; but the history of the world is full of examples of

mittee of General Safety would provide fit preceptors for the children of the ci-devant king.

Mathieu, the Reporter, observed that it was necessary to refute this *fable of royalism*; that the committee had taken the best measures to secure as much as possible the detention of the children of the tyrant, and had no intention to mitigate their captivity, or give them instructors. "The Committee and the Convention (says he) know how to strike off the heads of kings, but not how to educate their children." Sentiments like these must be abhorred by every body: I adduce them only as an argument to prove, that we are grossly deluded when we are told of the assistance we may expect from the royalists in Paris.

insignificant

insignificant states, which by the astonishing energy inspired by democratic revolutions, have defeated all the forces of the greatest monarchies. Rome, when she banished the Tarquins and became a republic, was assailed by all the kings of Italy; whom she repulsed and finally conquered (*a*).

Every

a The conduct of the Romans at this period bears a strong resemblance to that of the French since the revolution. When Tarquin was banished, Collatinus, the husband of the violated Lucretia, was chosen one of the Consuls in preference to Valerius, not on account of superior virtue or talents, but because he was imagined to have a keener hatred against the family of the tyrant.—In France the Brissotin and Rolandist parties lost all credit with the people by attempting to save the life of Louis the XVI.

The ambassadors of Tarquin were refused an audience by the senate—an oath was taken never to submit to him, but to maintain the liberty of Rome by force of arms.—Brutus ordered two of his own sons to be put to death, for conspiring to restore him; a multitude of other conspirators shared the same fate. Collatinus was deprived of the consular dignity, for attempting to save the lives of his nephews, who were acquainted with the conspiracy; and he was banished from the city, because he was related to the tyrant. The people were allowed to plunder the goods belonging to the king, and his palace was levelled with the ground. His cause was afterwards espoused by the Latins, and by Porfenna, the most powerful Prince in Italy, who besieged Rome with an immense army.

During the siege, the Romans were afflicted with a pestilence, and distracted by the number of the king's friends, who were yet in the city, and whom they were obliged to terrify by frequent executions. They were also harassed at the same time by a Tuscan army.—Porfenna, admiring the heroism of the Romans, and seeing the folly of attempting to subdue them, was at length induced to abandon the cause of the few exiles who had assured him that the assistance of their friends in Rome, and the weakness of the other party, would enable him to restore Tarquin without much difficulty. After this event, Tarquin was assisted by other states, who were soon compelled to make peace upon such terms as the Romans pleased to dictate. At last, after a contest of three years, he found all hope of affecting a counter-revolution vain, and returned to the city of Tusculum, where he lived 14 years, with his wife, in a private manner. See Plutarch in Poplicolam, Dionysius Hal. Lib. 5.—Livy Lib. 2. Eutropius, Lib. 1. Florus (cap. 9) speaking

Every one knows the glorious and successful struggle made by a few of the inhabitants of Switzerland against the whole power of the house of Austria, for 20 years; and by Holland during thrice that period against the Spanish monarchy, although these rebellious states, as they were then termed, were infinitely inferior in ordinary resources to those that attempted to oppress them. The league of Cambray formed by a junto of despots for the destruction of the republic of Venice was in the end as unsuccessful as the confederacy of Pilnitz has hitherto been. The histories of ancient Greece and modern Italy afford many instances of a similar nature. We all know the nature of the American war and its fortunate termination; yet there are still found among us persons who talk of subjugating France.

It may be asked, cannot England make the same exertions and sacrifices that France has made? Cannot all the people able to bear arms, all ships, provisions, artifices, and

speaking of these times, makes use of the following remarkable expressions. —*Populus Romanus ad vindicandum libertatis ac pudicitiae decus, quodam quasi instinctu deorum concitatus, regem repente destituit, bona diripit, agrum Marti suo consecrat, imperium in eisdem libertatis suae vindices transfert, mutato tamen jure & nomine—Tantumque libertatis novae gaudium inceserat, ut vix mutati status fidem caperent; alterumque ex consulibus, tantum ob nomen & genus regium, facibus abrogatis, urbe dimitterent. Itaque substitutus Valerius Poplicola ex summo studio annixus est ad augendam liberi populi majestatem.—Et ne specie' arcis offenderet eminentes aedes suas in plana submisit.—Liber jam hinc populus Romanus, prima adversus externos arma pro libertate corripuit; mox pro finibus; deinde pro fociis; tum gloria & imperio, lacescantibus assidue usque quaque finitimis.—Omnibus portis in hostem incurrerat: donec quasi contagione quadam per singulos itum est & proximis quibusque correptis, totam Italiam sub se redegerunt.—Rome, at the time of dethroning Tarquin, was less powerful, compared with the rest of Italy, than France is now, compared with the rest of Europe.*

money

money be put in requisition to enable ministers to obtain their object. It is not certain that a nation so fond of the conveniences and luxuries of life as we are, would consent to abandon them all, and encounter the hardships and dangers of a military state. The men of property, who have hitherto supported the war, would feel themselves uneasy when they found that the interest of the national debt was applied to accelerate the conquest of France, that the capital itself might be annihilated, that all the produce of their estates must be seized for the support of our armies, and that they themselves would be obliged to turn out and join the aspiring heroes who were going to march to Paris. If even these great exertions could be made, they would ultimately be defeated by the superior population, resources and enthusiasm of France.—How could the people of England become enthusiasts in such a cause? What glory or advantage is there in view for which they would submit to so many calamities to the destruction of their tranquillity, their commerce, their wealth, their personal freedom, and to the rigorous and despotic authority that would be necessary to support these measures? The real object of the War is the safety and aggrandizement of the minister, of which he cannot assure himself until the destruction of liberty in France shall facilitate the destruction of the constitution of England. The War is not a national concern. The country is a party to it only in its calamities. It presents no object to patriotism. The people cannot be otherwise than cold with respect to its success. Some who complained of the evils attending it, were reproached with the example of the French, who it was said, in the midst of all their distresses, had remitted nothing of their lofty language, and arduous exertions. Had we been in the same situation, we might probably have been
equally

equally magnanimous. They fought for the preservation of their property, their liberties, and their lives—We fight to destroy the liberty of other countries, for the support of an administration, who are preparing to reward us (most justly) by destroying our own.

I have hitherto confined myself to a consideration of the improbability of the success of our offensive operations, and I have admitted, for the sake of the argument, that our resources are inexhaustible, our allies faithful, and our people obedient. I have presumed that the enemy will be driven from all his conquests, and that our armies in the next, or some subsequent campaign, will be as victorious as they were when they conquered the chief fortresses of the northern frontier of France. With all these supposed advantages, that we shall fail in subduing that country is, I think, beyond a doubt; and unless the principle of the war, and the present administration are changed, I am not so sanguine as some persons whose opinions I revere, about our means of defence.

One country, till this time deemed impregnable has already fallen in the contest. The united provinces which successfully resisted the power of Spain for upwards of half a century, and all the power of Louis IV. when all Europe trembled at his name, have been unable to sustain the fury of the enemy. The defeat may perhaps be owing to a diminution of the martial spirit of the Dutch, or to the gradual encroachment of their government, which left them nothing worth defending. Whether we should labour under the latter disadvantage if invaded, it may be difficult to determine. That which renders France at this time so dangerous to the rest of Europe is the enthusiasm of her people. It is not the wild enthusiasm of Barbarians (though such an enthusiasm has been equal to the conquest of the greatest part of the world) but an enthusiasm

thufiasm perfectly civilized, difciplined and obedient.— While a power almoſt deſpotic impels or reſtrains it at pleaſure, every art and ſcience contribute their aid to regulate and improve its fury. Experiments in natural philoſophy that were formerly diſplayed only to gratify curioſity, and various inventions, have been applied by the French for the ſafety of their own troops and the deſtruction of their enemies; while the allies, without improvements, inventions, or enthufiaſm, continue the conteſt coldly and fluggiſhly; their operations paſſied by diſunion and mutual jealousies and by the promotion of perſons to the command of their armies, who are ill-fuited to rival the military talents of the republican generals.

The victories obtained by the French during the laſt campaign, are only to be paralleled in the hiſtory of thoſe countries, who, impelled by the cravings of hunger, or the madneſs of fanaticiſm, have ſuddenly conquered all the nations around them. The enemy during that campaign captured 144 towns and cities, among them ſome of the ſtrongeſt fortrefſes in Europe—won ſix deciſive pitched battles—took 2,803 pieces of cannon—and obliged 60,000 of the beſt troops in Europe to ſurrender as priſoners of war, either by capitulation or in the field. With the additional ſtrength and ſpirits acquired by theſe victories, and by the conqueſt of the United Provinces in the preſent year, it is not very improbable that France will be able, in the courſe of one or two campaigns more, (if the war be unfortunately continued ſo long) to force Auſtria, Spain, and the Italian powers to make peace as Pruſſia has done; or, if they reſuſe to treat, to ſubdue them completely, or reduce their power ſo far, as to leave her at liberty to purſue her inveterate enemy, the Engliſh government, without apprehenſions of being diſturbed by them.

In this situation she might easily spare from her armed myriads three or four hundred thousand men for the invasion of these islands.

To prevent expeditions of this nature, our chief reliance is upon our navy, and it is certainly our best defence; but it is far from being certain that we shall always maintain our present superiority by sea. The French are said to be making immense naval preparations: they have above one hundred ships of the line on the stocks in their different dock-yards; the conquest of Holland puts in their power a number of ships of war, a quantity of naval stores, and what is of more consequence, 30,000 excellent seamen, who, besides their skill and courage, are said to possess a strong antipathy to this country. It is not easy to calculate the advantages that France may derive from this assistance. Holland was once able to dispute the sovereignty of the sea with England and France united. Since that time, however she has been enfeebled by age, luxury, and servitude, and her marine has been diminished; but her seamen are nearly as numerous and as good as ever. This class of men, whose employment inures them to hardships and danger, are not liable to catch the effeminacy that grows up along with the wealth of a commercial state.

If an attempt is made upon this island before Spain is subdued, we have not much assistance to expect from her navy. She will be employed as far as her sloth will permit, in opposing the French by land. But if she is conquered before we are invaded, the activity of the enemy will not suffer her fleet to remain idle.

To cover an invasion it is not necessary that the enemy should have a great naval superiority. Their object might be accomplished, if their fleet was strong enough to keep ours engaged until they disabled it, or until their troops

were landed, although their fleet might be defeated in the end. It would be a few weeks before our disabled ships could be refitted, and theirs might be ready nearly at the same time, to convoy provisions to their armies. Ireland might be invaded from Port L'Orient, and Scotland from Holland, with certain winds that would not permit our fleets in Plymouth or Portsmouth to disturb the invaders. Their usual audacity might make them confident of success, and careless about the means of returning home. What the event might be if the invading army was of considerable force, I tremble to contemplate. My apprehensions do not proceed from an opinion that the people of Ireland and Scotland do not possess sufficient courage to defend themselves; but from supposing that their decided aversion to the violent measures of administration may render them almost indifferent to the preservation of his majesty's government, and careless of the event of any contest in which his majesty's rights may be supposed to be principally concerned.

The loyalty of the English nation would, I trust, defeat any attempt of this kind. That this would be the case is not however absolutely certain: But it is certain, that in any event we should be subject to many dreadful calamities. It has been justly remarked, that invasions have been often successful. The invader, if victorious, will have accomplished a grand object, and acquired perhaps considerable spoils. He therefore brings to the contest the ardour and activity that arise from lively hopes, and that contribute so powerfully to the success of all military operations. His enemy seldom feels so much animation, unless he defends some new religion, or some popular government, the novelty, enthusiasm, or supposed advantages, of which may enflame his mind with fury against those who attempted to
destroy

destroy his favorite system, and operate upon him like the hope of glory, or the prospect of plunder. In general he does not positively gain any thing, if victorious; but he suffers much whether vanquished or victorious. He has therefore every thing to lose and nothing to gain, while the invader has every thing to gain and nothing to lose. We know from the events of the year 1780, that this metropolis contains multitudes who would seize on any opportunity of plundering without dread of punishment. Since that year the city has increased in population and wealth; and it is probable that the quantity of its wretchedness is not diminished.

The first appearance of the enemy in the country would occasion such a general panic, that the farmers might not think it safe to send their provisions to London. Every imagination can behold the horrors that even one day's famine would produce in such a place. The effects of hunger might prove fatal to government, which can not exist in safety, unless the poor are either fed or hanged. As the enemy advanced, I fear there are many among this class, who, when they saw that danger must be encountered on one side or the other, might think it a better game to plunder than protect their masters *. Even among the men of property, who pretend to be so strongly attached to the king and constitution, there is a great number that would abandon every thing to preserve their money. These unworthy persons would begin to discuss the dangerous questions, whether their property would suffer more from the taxes and requisitions of our own government

* At Leyden and a few other towns of the United States, as soon as the French approached, the patriots began to plunder the adherents of the Stadtholder.

than

than from the contributions levied by the enemy, and whether they would not lose more money by a long continuance of the war, than by an immediate submission to the invaders. In the latter case they would hope for an opportunity of saving their wealth by emigration or some other means. In the former they would persuade themselves (for interest always supplies argument) that the French, who are renowned for their fury, audacity and perseverance, would never abandon the contest, while they had a man left to maintain it.

I will not add to these causes of apprehension, the disaffection that may be reasonably supposed to exist in the minds of a great number of his majesty's subjects, who are excluded from a fair participation in the rights of the constitution by the test laws: an exclusion by which the legislature calumniates and degrades them, representing them to the public as unworthy and suspected persons. I believe our injured and insulted fellow-citizens would forget, as they have often done before, the ingratitude and injustice of their country in its danger; and that they would exert every effort in its defence. The first to fly would probably be the first promoters of the war; the place and pension gentlemen.

I do not mention these things with a view to make us distrust our own strength. In times of danger nothing is so necessary as to state the whole truth, and nothing so pernicious as flattery and misrepresentation. But supposing the loyalty and energy of England to repel and overwhelm her invaders, what should we not endure while the conflict lasted?

The first measure of government, at the commencement of it, would be a requisition of all persons able to bear arms; a most unwelcome summons to that numerous class who
have

have been accustomed to peaceful and sedentary employments, and who could not relinquish, without regret, the ease and tranquillity of mind which such occupations generally bestow. The money of individuals must be taken by force, for the monied men would be very unwilling to supply government on such an occasion, unless for premiums so extravagant that government could not give them. If this plan were not adopted, a paper currency must be issued and supported either by means of violence, which will be equivalent to a robbery of the persons upon whom it is forced, and which can give it value only for a short time, or by seizing as a pledge for it the lands and revenues of the clergy, who will hardly admit that any state-necessity can justify the expedient. All commerce and manufactures would cease, and the interruption would produce enormous evils, as we depend so much upon the sale of our manufactures to procure us provisions from other countries. The high fever of the public mind would give fresh irritation to political parties. Each would load its adversaries with invective and reproach, and accuse them of being the authors of the public calamity; and their disputes, like similar ones in other countries, might soon lead to plundering, massacres, or even a civil war. All parts of the kingdom would present scenes of horror. It would be necessary to have a gallows or a guillotine permanent in every city to enforce the requisitions and repress disorders, and we might think ourselves singularly fortunate if these instruments of death could command obedience to the laws.

This picture of calamity may appear too highly drawn: But let it be recollected that is not more horrible than that which France exhibited when she was invaded by the allies. It may be asked, can not we overcome all difficulties and dangers

dangers as well as France did? We can, we ought, and I trust we should. But is not the probability, or even the bare possibility, that the continuance of the war may bring upon us, the misery which so long affected that unhappy country an irrefragable argument for immediate peace? What shall we think of the folly, wickedness and madness of the men, who have brought us into a situation in which we have reason even to dread such calamities, and who obstinately persist in measures, which, if continued, will make their coming almost certain, and considerably accelerate their arrival? What punishment will these gentlemen deserve, if, by their conspiracy against freedom, they shall achieve the destruction of this country? Will not their share of its misfortunes be a sufficient punishment? Alas! they expect to be the smallest sufferers by the public ruin. They hope, no doubt, to follow the magnanimous example of their friends on the continent, who fled at the approach of danger and abandoned their people, for whom they too had always professed the warmest affection, to the mercy of an enraged enemy. If we are invaded, they will resolutely remain at their posts until 12 or 14,000 of our brave defenders are cut to pieces (if such should be the fate of war, which Heaven avert) and then collecting as much of the public money as can be conveniently transported, they may take refuge, as they delight in the society of the virtuous and humane, with their ally the Empress of Russia. Under her majesty's pious protection they may shelter themselves from the resentment of their country, whose folly and misfortunes will afford pleasant subjects for laughter or pity, according to the humour of the moment, while they are consuming its spoils in their bacchanalian orgies.—Many who admit the propriety of an immediate peace are of opinion that it cannot be obtained with honor,

as they think there cannot be found among the enemy fit persons to treat with.

Few will deny that the government of France have sufficient power to entitle them to negotiate. If this point be doubted, the King of Spain, the King of Sardinia, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Germany and the Statdholder, can give testimony in their favour. The exertions of authority displayed by the French government have astonished the most absolute, and sanguinary despots. But that government who can command such efforts of their subjects, can by a moderate exertion of authority, cause a cessation of effort. They who have power to maintain hostility, which is a state of action and danger, can easily maintain peace, which is a state of comparative inactivity and repose. The characters of the persons who govern France are said to be so objectionable, that ministers cannot negotiate with them consistently with the public dignity. It is not easy to conceive what aggravation of guilt and accumulation of infamy can render a government unworthy of being acknowledged by those who treat with the Dey of Algiers and the Empress of Russia. Some time ago France was governed by persons with whom no good man would have corresponded with satisfaction; but even then his majesty's ministers should not have been prevented by their crimes from putting an end to our calamities. Fortunately for France, and for the rest of the world, these execrable persons are no more, and their system of terror, proscription and murder has been subverted by justice, wisdom and moderation. Most of the nations of Europe, even our most zealous allies, have acknowledged the French government in some mode, and have not disdained to treat with its servants. Why then do his majesty's ministers continue so squeamish? I am afraid that

Tallien

Tallien or any other person who represented France would have good reasons for refusing to treat even with them, if moral character could in any case create a reasonable diplomatic objection. They might say to them, using a little exaggeration. " You have never ceased to calumniate the French republic. Whenever you spoke of its representations, your discourses contained nothing but malice, falsehood and scurrility. (a) By violating the rights of nations, you excited Europe to rise against us, and you attempted to starve a people whom your arms could not subdue. Abandoning the generous boldness of your ancestors, your hostilities partook of the baseness and treachery of your hearts. By means as execrable as the end which they were to promote, you filled the republic with massacres, insurrections and rebellions. You excited our citizens to rend the bosom of their country, and in conformity with the rest of your conduct, you at last abandoned the instruments of your malevolence. To hold correspondence with such men as you, would be an eternal dishonor to France. Mindful therefore, of our own characters, and of the dignity of the sovereign people whom we represent, we scorn to treat with you."

Such might be the sentiments of the French government if they adopted the absurd principles of our administration. But happily they are more wise; for we know from their late treaties with the King of Prussia and the Duke of

a In the House of Commons various appellations have been given to the French people, and their representatives, such, as national brutes, rascals, villains, cut-throats, robbers, plunderers, ravishers, murderers, deists, atheists, pagans, heathens, hell-hounds, blood-hounds, monsters of hell, savages, cannibals, &c. &c. &c.

Tuscany, and from many of their late public declarations, that they would not be unwilling to negotiate with us, if a proposal were made to them for that purpose, or if they had reason to know that proposals coming from themselves would not be treated with the contempt with which his majesty's ministers have hitherto received them.

The sacrifices and exertions that the French people are obliged to make to support the war, must render them desirous of peace if they could obtain it without abandoning the liberty, or the honor of their country. The Convention depend upon the will of the people for their power and safety, and it is not to be presumed that they would continue hostilities if the people were informed, as they soon would be by the disaffected party, that a fair opportunity offered for restoring peace. They would not consent, for they are not quite so patient and insensible as some of their neighbours, to endure the unnumbered calamities of warfare only to gratify the obstinacy, or caprice of their rulers. With what pretence could that convention, in the face of the people upon whom their lives and fortunes depend, refuse to make peace with this country, when their principal accusation against 22 of their own colleagues whom they put to death, was for declaring war against it? They may also have strong personal motives for wishing for a general peace. They have already no doubt (at least they who are in the reigning committees) appropriated a portion of the public wealth to their own use, and they know by experience that as long as the war lasts the minds of the people will be subject to violent agitations, in some of which they might lose their money and their lives. Peace would produce a calm that would give them a better chance of security and enable them to retire

unnoticed. If peace would put an end to future speculations, it might secure the fruits of the past.

They have been unjustly accused of entertaining a rancorous and inveterate animosity against the people of England. When they speak of us, they generally make a distinction between the people and the government, a distinction which for the honor of the English name, I hope has been made, and they mention us thus separated in terms of esteem and affection. The design imputed to them of subverting our constitution and establishing their own republican system in its stead, proved rather their folly than their enmity: for they who desire to bestow upon us what they consider the first of all human blessings, and for the preservation of which they sacrifice every thing that mankind deem valuable, ought not to excite in our breasts any violent indignation on account of the meditated bounty. It is true that the tone of the Convention has not been always favorable to us. They have on some occasions, chiefly when they have been exasperated by losses, treasons and defeats, uttered execrations and menaces against the whole nation; and considering the injuries we have offered and the miseries we have occasioned to them, their feelings must have been very singular, if their conduct had been different. But since the overthrow of Robespierre, they have resumed the language of amity and moderation. The cruel decree for refusing quarter to English soldiers has been repealed with applause, and several of our countrymen have been liberated from confinement. We ought to avail ourselves of these symptoms of returning friendship, and to improve on our parts, the favorable opportunity by dismissing the authors of our common calamities; by punishing and disgracing the promoters of the treaty of Pilnitz, and the defenders

defenders of the atrocious manifestoes of the Duke of Brunswick, (a) and by placing in their room a virtuous and popular administration. When the French saw that they had to treat with men who had the hearts of the people, who from the beginning of the revolution had expressed their abhorrence of the treaties and manifestoes of the confederacy, and had strenuously maintained that the French republic ought to have been acknowledged, there would be no obstacle in the way of an immediate and lasting peace.

It would be highly dangerous to infer from these observations, if they are admitted to be just, that the French will always be pacifically inclined, even upon our making concessions, and that we may continue in hostilities for one or more campaigns, without any other loss than the blood, treasure, and happiness that will be squandered in the mean time. A certain degree of success may incline an enemy to peace, but if the success be so great that his adversary is unable to oppose him, he will listen to nothing short of unconditional submission. When the French took Maestricht, and a few other towns, his highness the Stadtholder thought that as they were in possession of a part of his dominions, he could not make a safe or honorable peace, and therefore the time was unfit for negotiation. General Pichegru was of the same opinion when he had taken Nimeguen, Gorcum, and Utrecht; he would not even deign to admit capitulation. There is a pride, or an insolence in human nature, that indisposes even persons of beneficent

(a) Let it be recollected by those who think no epithet sufficiently opprobrious for the French character, that the daughter of his Royal Highness was offered protection by a French general.

intentions,

intentions, from accepting by treaty, what they can command by conquest, and allowing as a right, what they can grant, with the reputation of generosity, as a favor. It will be too late for treaty, when a hundred thousand Frenchmen are marching to London.

Although the hardships of war may have made the French desirous of peace at this time, we cannot safely argue that they will always have the same effect. When the sufferings of men rise to a certain height, they are apt to feel a savage gratification in submitting to any calamities that they may undergo by giving a loose to their fury and revenge. The vindictive passions of the French are sufficiently strong, and if we persist in harassing them as we have done, if they are obliged by the embarrassments of their finances (occasioned by us) to make a general, or partial bankruptcy; if we continue to subsidize half the nations of Europe for the purpose of heaping misery upon them, their exasperation will be too ardent, and their thirst of vengeance too insatiable to suffer them to listen to any terms that we can propose, or to be contented with any sacrifice short of the utter ruin of our country.

When they have crippled or subdued the powers that press immediately upon them, the whole torrent of their fury will pour upon us. England will seem to be a prize too rich, and in their audacious imaginations, too easy of acquisition to be relinquished, and they will persist in this opinion until fortune declares whether they shall compensate themselves by English wealth for their sufferings, or we by submitting to sacrifice every thing, and to endure all the calamities that we shall have inflicted upon them, can give the world another example to prove, that a free people, fighting in defence of their country, is invincible.

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It will be highly dangerous to our security, and the peace of Europe, if the war continues long enough to confirm in military passions and habits the myriads who compose the armies of France. After a few years service, dangers and hardships will become familiar to them. The enthusiasm that urges them, the applauses they receive, and the hope of preferment and wealth, (a) will give them a distaste to all sober and useful employments. Victories and conquest will more than all tend to inflame this military phrensy. If we continue the war until all the commercial and manufacturing capitals of France are broken, the military profession will be almost the only road to wealth, honour, or popularity, in that country. The profits of agriculture are small, and it is considered an humble occupation by ardent and ambitious persons: besides, the soil of France requires so little labour, that a quarter of the inhabitants is more than sufficient to cultivate it. If these causes should make the military character so far predominate in France, that war should be pursued by the majority of the citizens as an occupation or amusement, and not encountered as a difficulty, I fear all the nations of Europe would soon be obliged to yield to her prowess and perseverance.

Our armies, it may be said, will acquire military habits and passions as quickly and as strongly as hers. This, from various causes, will not be exactly the case; and if it

(a) It is not an inconsiderable cause of the bravery and enthusiasm of the French soldiery, that every private man may, by the regulations of the service, indulge a well-founded hope of arriving at the command of a regiment, or even of an army. The best of the present republican generals served a few years ago in the ranks,

should

should be so, the observation brings little consolation; for the French will maintain, *ceteris paribus*, their present superiority.

How long the war must be continued before France grows into a decided military republic, having no passion but war, no ambition but for conquest, it is not possible to calculate. Every day of hostilities, every merchant-ship that we may take from them, every town that we may destroy, every source of their commerce that we may dry up, will serve as much to accelerate that terrible event as their own victories.

They are certainly not yet so much impoverished by the war, as to be indifferent to the advantages of peace, nor so thoroughly inured to a military life, as to be insensible to its hardships: but a single campaign may occasion extraordinary alterations in their tempers. If we lose the present opportunity of saving the country from ruin, we may never have another.

Among other pretexts for continuing the war, his majesty's ministers object strongly to acknowledge the French republic, as the Convention require it to be recognized, upon the principles of liberty and equality, founded on the inalienable and imperscriptible rights of man. To make this recognition, it is said, would be to admit the unlawfulness of every government in Europe, and to sign the deposition even of our own king, and the annihilation of our parliament. As applied to England, this objection is not just, whatever it may be in regard to some other countries. Our government has received from the revolution of 1688, a kind of popular sanction; it still emanates in some measure from the people, and is modified and controuled, if not directed by persons whom they appoint. I do not there-
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fore see how, by the fullest admission of the rights of any other people, we can be said to disclaim the principles of a constitution, containing so much democracy as ours.

But if the title which the French nation is pleased to assume were in the highest degree ridiculous, and even inconsistent with the rights of other states, I think we ought not to quarrel with them about it, if the precedents of former times are allowed to have any authority. When France was governed by Kings they were denominated *most christian*; and our gracious sovereign, his present majesty, gave that title to Louis XVI. before the revolution, and persisted in distinguishing him by it long after it had been formally abolished; although by using that title his majesty acknowledged a christian pre-eminence to reside in a person who belonged to a sect which the laws of this country stigmatized as an antichristian and damnable heresy, and which his majesty's faithful subjects were bound, if required, to abjure. With what appearance of propriety can his majesty refuse to acknowledge the new title of France, on the ground, that it impeaches his own right to govern these kingdoms, when his majesty assumes a title which destroys not by implication but directly, the right of any one but himself to govern France?

Another objection of ministers to treat for peace at this time is, that we could not, considering the events of the last campaign, expect favorable terms. This point is not certain, for until we make the experiment by negociation, we cannot tell what terms the enemy would accede to. Whatever they might be, the present posture of affairs does not seem to promise that we shall be able to obtain better by continuing the war. It is not indeed likely that France will abandon the conquests she has won by such extraordinary sacrifices

sacrifices and exertions. The fair and obvious criterion of adjusting terms of peace is the relative strength of the belligerent parties at the time of entering upon the treaty, and it must be thence considered what would be the probable consequences of continuing hostilities. Were we at this time in the advantageous situation of France, I think a good minister would not only refuse to restore any of our conquests, but he would insist upon the cession of all the territories that had been taken from us, and perhaps demand some farther advantage, as a recompence for relinquishing our well founded expectations of future conquests, and an inducement, to forego all the advantages to be derived from our immense and formidable armaments, and the feeble, disunited and distracted state of our enemies.

But it is said that if we leave France in possession of Holland and Flanders at the end of the war, the treaty of peace would be the death warrant of England. Let us examine the truth of this assertion.

The time is not very remote since we contended against Holland, France, Spain and another power possessing more energy and resources than Portugal and all the states of Italy put together; and yet we did not find that the existence of the nation was in the smallest danger. All these countries (America excepted) made use of their regular means only, and if the combination had been aided by as many more countries of equal power (in the same circumstances we should have defended ourselves successfully against them all.

The enthusiasm that now animates France and renders her so terrible is a violent passion that must subside if not constantly supported by some violent impulse, such as the abhorrence of tyranny, or of a certain religion; or a thirst
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of conquest, glory, or revenge. If peace were established, no impulse to support enthusiasm would remain. Commerce, manufactures, agriculture and the arts would be cultivated, and France would soon lose her present furious and enterprising spirit, and gradually become a regular and flourishing state, using in case of hostilities none but regular means. She would at all times, undoubtedly, display the military vigor that belongs to democratic states; but she would be infinitely less formidable then at present. It is not likely that she would ever have a cause of war capable of infusing so much enthusiasm into the minds of the people as that which she now maintains. In no other cause would any people submit to the violent exertions of authority that the French government have been obliged to make. We should therefore have nothing to apprehend, with regard to our existence as a nation, if we conclude a peace which shall have the French in quiet possession of all their conquests. But if the war continues, the original cause of it will keep up their enthusiasm which puts every thing in danger.

What has not England to fear when the immense mass of resources now possessed by France is impelled by that terrible energy, which when exerted upon resources comparatively small was sufficient to defeat the assaults of all the military powers of Europe?

Mr. Pitt, speaking of the consequences of a fresh rupture with France, which he asserts would follow close upon the heels of a peace negotiated at this time, makes a representation, which if I mistake not, is diametrically the reverse of the truth. He addressed the House of Commons in those words; viz. " You would have put an end to the machine which is with so much difficulty set in motion and which can scarcely at the end of two years be raised to

the pitch necessary to try the national strength; a pitch to which it would be almost impossible to raise it again in the same space. On the other hand the enemy would find it as impossible to disband their troops as with respect to your forces, you would find it necessary. They would again be prepared to start with the same gigantic resources, deriving fresh confidence from the disposition which you had shewn to peace, and new vigor from the interval which had been afforded to hostilities."

I conceive that France would be precisely in the situation which Mr. Pitt predicts of England. She would find it impossible to raise the national strength, in the space of two years to its present greatness. Her resources have proceeded from extraordinary causes, and have been exacted with extraordinary rigor, and applied with extraordinary energy. Can it be supposed that the government of France have power to inflame the whole nation with enthusiasm at pleasure; or to put in requisition all the men capable of bearing arms, and seize three-fourths of all the landed property of the country to pay them with? These are the resources which have enabled France to perform such wonders. On the other hand, England has made use of none but regular resources, such as the ordinary authority of government is sufficient to command. The war has undoubtedly impoverished those resources, but the interval of a few years peace would restore them, and we should be prepared to start with a great regular force against a wearied and impoverished enemy.

It is not likely that the enemy would find it impossible to disband their troops. If the French government has power enough to make peace, and restrain their armies from committing hostilities, they must have the power to disband them,

them. Will not the same authority which it was said dragged them from their families, and forced them to encounter hardships and danger, be sufficient to bring them back again, and restore them to ease and peace? The enemy would find it impossible not to disband their troops, because they would find it impossible to pay and feed them without levying upon the people such enormous contributions as no free people would endure, unless for a better purpose than maintaining immense armies when there was no occasion for them. Some suppose that they cannot be disbanded on account of the excesses and disturbances that must follow. They who reason in this manner imagine that every army is like our own; though when 100,000 even of our soldiers were disbanded at the conclusion of the last war, we did not hear of any dreadful excesses. The French armies are now composed of the most respectable citizens, who may serve in the ranks without fear of being insulted or flogged. Before the troops are disbanded, which it is probable they will be gradually, they may be required to deliver up their arms, and to return to their homes in small parties, which cannot do great mischief in a country where all the inhabitants are armed.

With regard to the disposition of the colonies of France, there will probably in a little time be no difficulty. The French seem more inclined to recover what they have lost by arms than by negociation. But if any of their territories should remain in our possession at the time of treaty, I think it would not be wise to retain them, particularly if their advantages were purely commercial. They might be the cause of a future war, the more dangerous as it would appear to have some connection with this; for all
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the conquests made with a view to subvert the republic would be considered no better than robberies.

They who dread the power of the enemy ought not to wish for the destruction of their commerce. When their islands were captured, I could not help considering the conquest as a national calamity. If we completely destroy their commerce, what concern or occupation do we leave them but war? France, possessed of flourishing colonies, and an extensive commerce, would be vulnerable in every part of the world, and therefore cautious of putting her wealth in danger by unnecessary wars; but without colonies or commerce, she could annoy the world with impunity. Without commerce, and its train of luxuries, the national character of the French will become stern and ferocious; for there will be nothing else of sufficient influence to soften their manners, and counteract the military spirit that appears to prevail among them. Commerce it is said, is a nursery of seamen: privateers and men of war, when in service, supply a much greater number of them. Algiers, without any commerce, has seamen enough to annoy the commerce of any nation in the world. Commerce and manufactures employ a multitude of persons much more advantageously to themselves than war: therefore commercial and manufacturing states will not, without exertions of tyranny that can very rarely be attempted, be able to have such immense armies as other states of equal population. States of the former kind will draw a great part of their military resources from commerce, and therefore they will endeavour to extend it. But the more extensive it is, it requires the greater protection in war, and thus a great part of the public force is diverted from offensive operations.

In commercial countries there is always a powerful interest, both in property and numbers, for preserving peace; and though this interest has been frequently disregarded in monarchies, it will always have great weight where the government is democratic. (*a*)

The truth of these positions has been proved by experience. When Holland made the powers of Europe and India tremble, her commerce was less considerable than at subsequent periods, when her political influence was despised. Denmark now flourishes in agriculture and commerce, and probably contains as many inhabitants as it did nine centuries ago; yet it is classed among the inferior states; but at that time, when it possessed no commerce, and very little agriculture, and was only a nursery of warriors, it was the scourge of Europe. To destroy the commerce of France, is to force upon France the character of Algiers, or to give to Algiers the resources of France; it is to give justice to the comparison which our enemies, in their pride and audacity, are so fond of making between themselves and the Romans, and between England and Carthage.

The member of the House of Commons who exclaimed "Perish commerce!" did not utter in that sentence a wish inconsistent with the object he professes to have in view; I think he fell rather short of what his principles require: instead of permitting our commerce to perish, if it were so inclined, he should have said, "Let commerce be de-

a It is well known, that the exertions of the commercial interests of the United States of America on a late occasion prevented a rupture between that republic and this country. Holland would probably have been in peace and security at this moment, but for the overbearing influence of the Stadtholder.

stroyed!"

stroyed!" If all our manufacturers were dragged from the loom and the warehouse; if all our tradesmen were turned into the armies; if our seamen were all pressed into privateers and men of war, and we were no longer encumbered with merchant-fleets, which require convoys, there would hardly be a more formidable nation in the world than England, as long as she had the means of supporting this new system.

It is very probable, that the loss of every thing convenient and agreeable might rouse the people to a degree of madness that would be a proper match for French enthusiasm. I have indeed some doubts whether their first fury would be directed against a foreign enemy: but I think it is clear, that we have little hope of security unless we adopt either the plan of the zealous advocates of the war, to raise immense armies, and create enthusiasm by destroying commerce, or that plan which I humbly propose, to disband the immense armies, and destroy the enthusiasm of the enemy, by giving them peace and commerce.

Peace upon these terms, it is objected, would give France a dangerous predominance in the affairs of Europe. The effects of the increased influence of France will be regarded according to the prejudices, interests, and passions of the speculator.

There are two classes of patriots in England:—The one would sacrifice every thing for the wealth and dominion of their country; the other have more at heart the preservation of our civil and political liberties, from the solid happiness which it is supposed they have power to bestow. Those who are of the first class will lament the aggrandizement of France: but the partizans of the other class will have no reason to behold it with grief.

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I have already attempted to shew that the subversion of French freedom would lead to the destruction of the liberty and happiness of this country. If France be reduced within her former limits at the end of the war, a few years may produce a new confederacy against her. The successful struggle she has now made, so glorious for herself, and so fortunate for our constitution,, was facilitated by the want of unanimity among her enemies, by the ignorance and imbecillity of their counsels, and more than all by their assailing her one after another. If a second confederacy be formed against their freedom, an event within the bounds of probability, the allies may start with extraordinary advantages: they will not, as formerly, despise her strength, but fall upon her with sudden and united efforts; and the republic, fatigued with past exertions, her spirits sunk, her enthusiasm extinguished, panic-struck perhaps, by an unexpected blow, may become the prey of despotism.

It must be acknowledged that the event is highly improbable; but it is not so improbable that it may be attempted. Such is the inveterate abhorrence of most of the princes of Europe to the French republic, that they will never let it rest if they think it possible to subvert it, or even to make the attempt without endangering their own existence. The world would be again in commotion and misery, of which we should have, as at present, a plentiful share. We cannot therefore assure ourselves of a permanent peace, unless France be left in a state too formidable to be attacked, even by all the princes of Europe, with impunity.

Ministers have asserted, that a peace made with the present government of France would not be permanent; for they say we could not expect from such a peace any cordial intercourse, any useful commerce, any desirable friendship;
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it would be a peace with an enraged enemy, in which there could exist no confidence on either side, and it would necessarily give rise to a state of jealousy, suspicion, and constant armament.

This argument, admitting the statement on which it is founded to be just, may be urged by the enemy as well as by us, and therefore it would authorize eternal hostility between us. But it is not easy to conceive, that the state of human nature is so forlorn, that any argument can be good which justifies two nations in fighting 'till one or both of them be destroyed.

The apprehensions of his majesty's ministers are not indeed unfounded, if they mean to continue in power after the peace. Can any sincere friendship, or cordial intercourse subsist between the French republic and those men who have repeatedly declared that their existence threatened Europe with ruin, and that the principles on which it was founded were destructive to religion, good order, and happiness? The characters of our ministers for fidelity, and strict observance of the law of nations, are not so high as to justify any person in supposing they would observe the stipulations of a treaty of friendship with the republic, if circumstances made it probable, that by another attack or confederacy they could rid themselves and the world of what they conceive to be such a dangerous and dreadful establishment; and if they should even resolve to alter their past conduct, to respect for the future the rights of nations, and refrain from violating the peace with France, it is not likely that the French government would thoroughly confide in their promises, or give them credit for their amendment.

In this situation, the French government, unless they possessed

possessed more good-faith and forbearance than have usually fallen to the share of the possessors of great power when likely to be insulted, might seize the first favourable opportunity for attacking this country, and alledge in extenuation of the breach of faith, the notorious enmity of our government to them, and the little ceremony it used in violating the law of Nations. They might state their just apprehensions of a rupture as soon as it might be convenient to our ministers; and urge, on the principle of self-defence, that they were right in striking the first blow. As long, therefore, as the present administration direct his majesty's councils, they will be an obstacle to the permanency of a peace. But if they are removed, and never more permitted to take the situation, which to the shame and grief of their country, they have shewn themselves unable to fill, I think, a peace made with the present government of France, would be likely to be as permanent as any peace made in any circumstance. When ministers speak of obtaining a permanent peace, they do not, I presume, apply the epithet permanent in its absolute and literal signification; for we can hardly expect a blessing which no great nation ever enjoyed. All that can be required to be shewn, is that a peace might be now made with the usual probabilities of permanence, and that the French would observe the stipulations of a treaty as faithfully as governments generally do.

They would probably respect a treaty of peace, because it would be highly their interest to shun war. It will be a long time before they recover what they have lost in this contention; and the sacrifices they have made will when they come to think coolly and dispassionately, prevent
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them from engaging in farther struggles, unless the interest and honour of their country demand them.

Can any thing be more absurd than that ministers who make treaties with the King of Prussia and the Empress of Russia, should refuse to make peace with the French, on the ground of apprehending that they would not observe the stipulations of any treaty? We are in amity with powers notoriously guilty of fraud, perfidy and treachery; while we refuse to discontinue hostilities with a government, that has hitherto observed good-faith to every nation with which it has maintained friendly correspondence.

It is a favourite argument with the advocates of the war, that the various parties, who have succeeded each other in Paris, however they differed in other things, were unanimous in their conduct to this country; and that they seemed when they mentioned it, to vye with each other in expressions of rage and indignation. ministers in this instance, as in many others, are fond of making a common cause with the nation, and unwilling that it should not share all the reproaches that are cast upon themselves. They are almost the only part of it that have been obnoxious to the furious declamations of the leaders of those parties; who, if they had ever spoken of them, in terms even bordering upon affection or esteem, must have been either destitute of the ordinary feelings of men, or very little concerned about the liberty, interests or honour of their country. The uniform conduct of all the French parties to foreign nations, whether hostile or neutral, justifies a strong presumption, that a peace made with them would be permanent, unless violated by ourselves or our allies. What principle but public duty could make

make so many jarring parties who differ from one another in every thing else, agree in their treatment and demeanour in foreign states? The same principle would operate as powerfully in peace as in war; and we should see that Brissotins, Rollandists, Federates, Moderates, Jacobins, men of the mountain and men of the valley, however they quarreled among themselves, would observe the stipulations of an amicable treaty, with the same punctuality with which they execute their threats.

The frequent changes that have happened and may again happen in the administration of the government of France, should not prevent negotiation with them. Such changes take place in monarchical governments, where the prince or the ministers with whom we treat this day, may die or be dismissed the next. During the first years of the present reign, the changes of his majesty's ministers, were almost as frequent as those we have seen in France since the revolution, and the different administrations, favoured different systems of foreign politics. The rapid succession of parties who governed France since the year 1792, may be easily traced up to the conduct of the allies and the events of the war. It is not, however, to be expected that peace will occasion a long continuance in power of any set of ministers in that country; for the laws of it have established a rotation in the higher offices of government, such as the constitutions of Venice and some other republics require. But if peace will produce stability in the system of government, or in that branch of the system with which alone we have any right to concern ourselves, it matters not how often the men that administer it are changed.

From the past conduct of our government, it is not easy to conjecture what sort of constitution, and what sort
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of administration must exist in France before his majesty's ministers are perfectly satisfied, and think they can conclude a safe and permanent peace. When the old despotism subsisted, we were always at war with it, except at intervals that might be more properly called truces than peace: and some who are now in the cabinet, delighted in accusing this government of perfidy and hostile intrigues. The constitution of 1790 succeeded, and it appeared to be less liked than the former. Rolland and Brissot were the first ministers of the republic after the battle of the 10th of August. That Mr. Pitt should be unwilling to treat with them is not surprising. The purity of their morals, and the republican simplicity of their manners, would naturally disgust him. The execution of these men was celebrated by some of his friends as a great act of justice;—an execrable murder, that will eternally stain the annals of the French Revolution, and excite more regret and indignation in the breasts of future philosophers than all the princes and nobility who have fallen during that eventful period. An admirer of the productions of nature, will feel more pain, when he sees cut down in full bloom, one of those rare and beautiful American aloes, that require a century of careful attention to bring them to perfection, than at the destruction of a thousand of the ordinary flowers that spring up like mushrooms, and are produced in abundance in every soil where there is rankness enough to support their vegetation.

The murder of the Brissotine party, established the authority of the ever infamous Robespierre. Robespierre, who commenced his political career with professions of devotion to the liberties of the people, and who became an apostate as soon as those professions had conducted him to power; Robespierre, who treated with haughtiness and contempt

contempt the representatives of the people, the majority of whom were decidedly against his administration until his artifices, and his misrepresentations to the public had awed them into acquiescence; who plundered the public treasury to bribe the supporters of his tyranny; and who exercised the most rigorous domination, under pretence of state-necessity. Robespierre, who represented himself in his turgid declamations, as the paragon of virtue, and like his archetype, made use of the cant of religion, as the last pretext to justify his crimes; Robespierre, who by filling his country with spies and informers, destroyed the confidence of private society; and encouraged the violation of private honour; Robespierre who corrupted the purity of courts of justice, and perpetrated what others (thanks to the glorious constitution of England) could only attempt; the murder, under colour of law, of his former friends and associates; even Robespierre so similar in his character and conduct to a person who is supposed to have considerable influence in the government of those kingdoms, was not thought worthy of that attention or indulgence, which men usually afford to those whose dispositions are congenial with their own. Robespierre, notwithstanding all his good qualities being rejected, with whom can we conceive that administration will treat? Varying their language according to circumstances; they have lately said, they desire to effect a pacification with any government in France, which shall appear capable of maintaining the accustomed relations of peace and amity with other countries; but when their speeches explain their proposition, it appears, that the present government of France, is never likely to be worthy of trust. The object of the war, then, is changed from the restoration of the old government of that country to
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the destruction of the present one. Mr. Pitt has, indeed, hinted that it is not impossible but the party now in power in France, may in time throw a veil over their former crimes, and conduct themselves upon such principles as may render them less dangerous; and by obtaining the acquiescence of their countrymen, may become such a power as may insure that stability and permanency, without which peace would be more dangerous than war. This language seems to prepare a subterfuge to justify any conduct in any event. If the next campaign be successful, jacobinism presents itself in all its horrors: if it prove unfortunate, the French government purifies its character by its conquests; and Mr. Pitt will suffer himself to be drubbed into good humour with them, and forced to acknowledge their virtues and competency. It may be asked, what is the kind of conduct that will throw a sufficient veil over the crimes of the French government? Must they restore the priests and emigrants, or abstain from celebrating annually the execution of Louis XVI.? If we were to make such a proposal, they would celebrate that event every month or every week.

The present party have continued in power more than nine months. How much longer must they remain triumphant before they can be denominated a permanent power? Are we to inflict upon ourselves all the miseries of war until their characters become pure and their power permanent? If this be the resolution, the public misery may be eternal. War is a bad school for the improvement of vicious characters, and the republican principles of the French, and the love of change, for which they have been so long remarkable, may prevent any set of men from being permitted to rule them for such a time as Mr. Pitt thinks

thinks necessary to give a government the character of stability.

That the present government of France is more infamous for crimes than the general run of the governments of Europe, is false. But if it were true, and a new Robespierre were again to erect a throne of terror in the midst of blood and tears, it is not positively clear that we should have any right to punish him: but if this point were most positively clear, prudence would certainly induce us to forbear interfering; if by becoming the avengers of innocence, we should punish ourselves as much as our enemy. Are we to suffer for their crimes? Is our commerce to be interrupted? Are our poor to be starved until the members of the national convention of France become men of virtue? If we resolve to become knights errant in the cause of virtue and religion, why do we appropriate all our powers to punish the government of France? The governments of some other countries are at least equally guilty; and the injury that may arise to society in these kingdoms, from the example of their successful villainy, is as great as can be apprehended from the guilt that is said to have been perpetrated with impunity in France; for though the scenes of iniquity are more distant, they are equally horrible and equally notorious.

It seems extraordinary that England should fear the establishment of a government, that other countries of inferior power behold with indifference. It would be more wise and honourable to acknowledge the French government, just as they are at this time, than to be forced to do it by disasters and defeats.

The conduct of the American government, in this particular, affords an example worthy of the attention of his

his Majesty's ministers. That wise and prudent power, at the time, when there was little stability in the executive government of the French republic, directed the credential letters of their ambassador, to him, her or them, who-soever, he, she or they might be, that were in possession of the executive power. The American ministers, therefore, never found themselves at a loss with whom to treat, being received with as much friendship and cordiality by one party, as by their predecessors, which the new ministers had just guillotined.

If the present war is distinguished by many peculiar calamities, an immediate peace would probably be attended with many peculiar advantages. In commerce we should be left without a rival, since most of the great commercial capitals of France and Holland, our only former rivals, have been broken by the war. It will require great exertions of industry and many years of peace, before these capitals can be restored. In the United States of America, the price of labour is so high, and the agricultural system necessarily so predominant, that they cannot for half a century, be formidable rivals to us in manufactures and trade. An immediate peace would give us the carrying trade of all Europe. France alone, if the commercial treaty were revived, would be an ample market for all our staple commodities. The republic of America, whose prosperity in a commercial view, is the prosperity of Great Britain, is now our richest and greatest market, which we could possibly supply more largely when our merchants were no longer in danger of being plundered by privateers. If the convulsions of the war have impoverished our customers in many parts of the world; as in Spain, Russia, the Italian States, and the nations on the

the Baltic, the loss would be compensated by our being unrivalled in their markets. To enjoy the whole of a certain portion of commerce, may be more advantageous, than to share a much greater portion with two or three rivals. But if we continue the war for a long time, our great trading capitals will be broken or dispersed, like those of Holland, Flanders and France. When danger becomes pressing and taxes extraordinarily burthensome, our merchants and manufacturers will endeavour to remove their capitals to some country where they may enjoy their wealth in security, and employ it to advantage, without being in danger of having the fruits of it seized by a rapacious government or a conquering enemy. If the war should continue till it produces these calamitous effects, it will not then be in the power of peace, to restore and aggrandize our commerce. Capital is seldom withdrawn from one country to another unless great advantages are promised to the owner by the removal; and it will require a stronger impulse to bring it back again, than that which removed it originally. It is highly improbable that a merchant who may emigrate to America should return after having established himself there. It would be to return from a land of oeconomy and abundance, to a country of extravagance and scarcity: from a land where the profits of trade are high, taxes low, and all the necessaries and most of the luxuries of life cheap, to a land where the profits of trade are small, taxes oppressive, the necessaries of life dear, and luxuries attainable only by persons of fortune. When a splendid commerce once departs from a nation, it seldom rises to its former grandeur; as Pavia, Venice, Genoa, Portugal and Antwerp demonstrate. Natural advantages are not so much the soul

of commerce as great pecuniary capitals, which have always an inclination to withdraw from countries afflicted by war and internal disturbances, and to seek refuge in the bosom of peace and liberty.

Peace would calm and moderate those political heats and dissensions, that have so dreadfully disturbed society.

The question of the establishment of the French republic has been the chief cause of them, and when this question was for ever closed, they would yield to the moderate disputes respecting constitutional points and parties, on which there never can be an uniformity of opinion, as long as men have different views, understandings, interests, prejudices and passions.

The greatest evils of the French revolution have been the private feuds, and the intolerant spirit it has engendered. When these are predominant, friendship is forgotten, honour violated, perfidy, treachery, and sometimes murder are committed, not only with impunity, but with applause, if the victim be politically obnoxious, and acts of mercy, forbearance and friendship, are held criminal if bestowed upon a person who is not on the right side; the public sense of right and wrong becomes violated; the milder virtues, which are the most estimable and the most useful, are disregarded, and they will cease to be practised as they cease to be admired.

The termination of this conflict, by the establishment of the French republic, would leave to future generations a grand and useful example that would teach the proud tyrants of the earth to forbear, or at least to mitigate their oppression. The successful struggle of a nation that has risen against its domestic despots, and crushed them to death, will be a lesson of more impression to every domineering aristocracy, than religion, honour or morality could convey,

convey, because it is addressed to their fears. It is a lesson that will teach the great not to dare to trample upon the people, to plunder them of the fruits of their industry, to sport with their feelings, and mock their misery; and it will also teach the people not to endure patiently insult and oppression; not to consider themselves an inferior order of beings, created only for the use of their masters, and not to feel themselves degraded because they do not possess those distinctions that often fall to the share of the meanest of mankind. Whoever has attended to the domestic manners of these kingdoms, must have observed that they have changed considerably since the French revolution, short as the period has been. The pride of the higher orders is humbled as much by their own fears, as by the spirit of enquiry and independence which the new events have excited in the minds of the lower and middling orders, who disdain to pay their former blind and servile homage to aristocracy, and who can no longer feel themselves abased in their own imaginations when they see persons of their own condition making all the princes and nobles of Europe tremble.

The establishment of the French republic would improve both republican and monarchical governments in the same manner, and for the same reasons that the reformation in religion a few centuries ago tended to improve both the papist and protestant clergy. The very words of the historian who has noticed this circumstance may be here applied. There is no doubt that the old literary contest between the admirers of republicanisim and the lovers of monarchy would be continued. Each government would become desirous that their conduct should afford an argument to their partisans. Between those who administered these governments there
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would exist the emulation natural between rivals. All their actions would fall under the severe inspection of each other's partisans, whom enmity and emulation would tempt to observe every vice, or even impropriety of conduct, to censure them without indulgence, and expose them without mercy. Princes must drop a portion of their former extravagance, insolence, and tyranny. In order to remove scandal, and silence the declamations of the democrats, lenity, œconomy, and moderation would become necessary. The reputation that the reformers may have among the people, would soon cause the regal governments to lose all credit, unless they conform to the new order of things. If they mean to preserve their authority, they must be cautious to avoid such enormities as might drive their subjects to rebellion, and studious to acquire the virtues that may merit their applause, and secure their attachment. The persons who govern France, as their power and fame are directly in the power and at the disposal of the people, must also be studious to govern them well, and to provide for them if possible the tranquillity enjoyed by the subjects of monarchies, as well as the liberty that should exist in every well-regulated republic. It would be the interest of the government of France to be steady and firm, and the interest of kings to be moderate and conciliating. Princes will not (as a great writer asserts) become tyrants through policy, and guard against revolutions by preventive massacre, and preventive assassination. This kind of policy would be more absurd than wicked; the prince that should adopt it would soon lose his crown and his head. The example of the French revolution will make every wise prince avoid the errors and crimes that produced it. He must avert revolutions by giving liberty to his people, by pre-
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ventive wisdom, preventive justice, and preventive moderation. The inhabitants of the European kingdoms will soon become too enlightened, and too sturdy to be swayed by any other means. Already has this great revolution begun to influence princes. We have seen the despots of Spain and Germany imploring the assistance of their subjects, and imploring without effect. This balance of government in Europe will merit consideration much more than the balance of power; the latter was only the affair of despots quarrelling about the disposition of slaves. To settle the former, the happiness and affections of the people must be regarded; and Europe may derive from its operation the same advantages which England has enjoyed from the balance and jarring of the powers that constitute our government.

Thus may the means of happiness be extracted from calamity; thus may the French revolution, which in its progress has filled Europe with terror, and threatened it with ruin, make a reparation for all the afflictions it has occasioned; and thus may the termination of the war be the commencement of a glorious, peaceful, and happy period.

One of the objections to a peace, by which the French republic should be acknowledged is, that it would introduce jacobinism amongst us and overturn our constitution. If the aristocracy obstinately persevere in refusing to reform its abuses; if the administration continues corrupt and extravagant; if no regard is paid to the sufferings of the people, and if the place and pension gentlemen are determined to permit no alleviation of their burdens, it must be confessed that our constitution would be in less danger if it were more remote from France. The people of England, holding constant correspondence
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with the citizens of France, would be on that account less inclined to permit the maturity of that system, which the ministers of the present reign have laboured with so much industry, to bring to perfection. But if a just and liberal reform be granted; if the people are restored to their constitutional rights, what have we to dread from the example of the French? Nothing, surely, from what has already happened. All the events of the French revolution tend to confirm the admirers of our constitution, in their partiality to it. These events, demonstrate the inferiority of a simple government of any form, to one that is compounded of various powers, which rarely permit such rigorous exertions of authority, as a single uncontrouled power can make upon ordinary occasions.

But, if, notwithstanding the amelioration of our constitution, and the relief granted to the people, by the virtue and œconomy of future ministers, there should exist among us any desperate and traiterous faction, conspiring to subvert our government and laws, and give us in place of them a revolutionary government and revolutionary tribunals; should we not possess in time of peace all the means of crushing such a faction, that we can have when we are at war? The militia may be kept embodied; the alien bill in force, and even the habeas corpus act suspended, if the danger were so pressing as to require such a violent measure. In these concerns, we should not be in danger of being disturbed by the French; it is very improbable that they will support any of our disaffected parties, however democratic in principle, that may solicit their assistance, as they have already suffered much by interfering or attempting to interfere in the concerns of other nations; and they have at times given such specimens of their fraternity and protection, that it should require

quire a very strong case of oppression, to justify any people in desiring or accepting their aid.

Whoever asserts that the destruction of the French republic is necessary for the preservation of his Majesty's prerogatives, calumniates his Majesty and his Majesty's faithful people. To enslave France cannot serve the interests of his Majesty, unless his Majesty has it in contemplation to enslave England also. It cannot add to the security of his lawful authority, for he has nothing to apprehend in any event, from the disaffection of the people. Their allegiance has been repeatedly and severely tried. In spite of all the efforts, of all the wicked and corrupt men, by whom his Majesty has had the misfortune to be advised almost ever since he came to the throne; in spite of the system of encroaching upon the liberties of the people, of corrupting and degrading their representatives; of exalting the aristocracy of the court, and abasing the aristocracy of virtue and patriotism; a system which has been uniformly and successfully maintained in his Majesty's counsels; in spite of the American war and the present war, both of them founded on wickedness and conducted with folly, and we may prognosticate, terminated in dishonour and calamity; in spite of the pertinacity with which his Majesty is advised to exact to the last farthing of his enormous household revenue, and to maintain all the ordinary parade and magnificence of his splendid establishment, when every order of his subjects bend under the yoke of taxation, and when the poor are literally starving; in spite of the shameless and infamous prodigality of a part of his majesty's family; their breach of faith and honour to the public; their injustice to individuals; their execrable and ungrateful insensibility to the miseries
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which the people have drawn upon themselves, by fighting their quarrel and supporting their rights; all which improprieties of conduct do certainly not originate with the illustrious personages alluded to, (for such conduct could proceed only from minds in the last stage of the most abandoned depravity), but with the evil counsellors by whom these illustrious personages are surrounded; when in spite of all these things, his Majesty continues to possess the affections of the people, is there any event within the compass of possibility that can alienate them from him? The attachment of this country to his Majesty, considering all the circumstances, is unexampled in history; and the men who say that peace would endanger his throne, know that they assert a falsehood. They say so because the war is necessary to preserve their own power; and they wish to unite their cause with that of his Majesty, that they may force into their service the loyal affections of his Majesty's people.

Do ministers suppose that we shall be so far seized with the mania of revolution, as to abandon the unexampled felicity, which they assure us we derive from the mild and paternal government of the house of Brunswick? What magic is there in the example of France, to produce such extraordinary conduct? If the example of the successful democratic revolution in that country, threatens ruin to the constitution of England, how has it escaped the influence of the glorious American revolution? Many circumstances attended this revolution, that would make it much more dangerous to us, if any revolution could be dangerous, than that which has emancipated France. The principles of both were equally democratic, equally adverse to hereditary nobility and to the kingly office, denominated by a correct figure, the corner-stone of our constitution,

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The contagion of the American revolution would be as strong as that which is now dreaded, because it was discussed in these kingdoms, at least as much as the French revolution; for the contest that made it the universal subject of writing and conversation, lasted a longer time; and the political principles of the American republicans were not soiled and dishonoured by those acts of cruelty and atrocious ingratitude, which have been perpetrated by the democrats of France, and have disgusted the best friends of their system, and caused the majority of observers, who do not distinguish between principles and the violation of them, to abhor the system itself. Yet, the constitution of England has survived the establishment of the American republic; and our monarchy never possessed greater strength during the last century, than it has enjoyed since that memorable event.

It is not peace, but it is the continuance of the war, that may effect, if any thing can effect, the destruction of our glorious constitution. The people of every nation, the people of England, perhaps above all others, are willing to endure much, before they subvert their government. The people of England endure at this time a great deal; and yet they endure their government, which is the principal cause of all their sufferings. Peace by alleviating those sufferings, would enable them to bear their burdens with less murmuring, and would give greater security to the government, to whom nothing is so dangerous as public discontent, whatever be the cause of it. War, by accumulating the burdens and increasing the hardships of the people, threatens the government with ruin; for when popular discontent is inflamed to a certain pitch, it never remains inactive; and the government being always considered the cause of the evil, is the first

object upon which a discontented and furious people discharge their rage.

If the object of continuing the war, be to prevent the insinuation of jacobin principles into this country, how much more effectual would peace be to that end; how much better an answer to the republican theories of Mr. Paine, the actual comforts and improving condition of the people, than even the most brilliant successes abroad, which might lessen those comforts and deteriorate that condition.

The people are unacquainted with abstract reasoning. They are never driven to rebellion by political principles. The price of coals and bread, the kidnapping of a fellow-subject, may be more dangerous than all the republican pamphlets that ever were written. The vilest orator of a debating club, would have more effect preaching sedition to an hungry multitude, than Demosthenes, Mirabeau and Fox, if their astonishing powers could be united to stir up to insurrection the same persons being well-fed and contented.

It is said, that if we make peace with France, no property in this country will be worth ten years purchase. Our politicians tell us, that the desire of confiscating land will be caught by the same contagion that is to urge us to overthrow our constitution. We cannot help supposing that the persons who make this assertion do not believe it; for their tribute to support a cause on the issue of which they say every thing depends, is by no means proportioned to the extent of their avowed apprehensions. To this argument it has been replied, that a refusal to contribute one's money may not be inconsistent with a considerable degree of attachment to the cause; for a man may love his money

money still better than the cause. This answer may be good as far as the cause implicates religion, social order, morality, humanity, &c.; but with respect to the danger of property, it is insufficient; for if men seriously believed that their property was in danger, their contributions to preserve it would be in the direct proportion of their avarice.

Former confiscations, as notorious, if not as numerous, as those which have been made in France, have not affected the property of this country. It is but half a century since the estates of several persons were confiscated under our own laws, and the owners executed, for fighting in support of an hereditary monarch, against the government established by the nation. During the American revolution, the property of the loyalists was rigorously confiscated, nor could the recommendation of Congress at the end of the war procure its restoration. At the two partitions of Poland, many of the confederate nobility lost their estates. Yet these instances of confiscation have had no ill effect in England. While our nobility demean themselves well, they need not apprehend the loss of their wealth: but if not contented with being the chiefs and ornaments, they become the tyrants and plunderers of their country—if they follow the example of the French nobility, others may be driven to follow the example of the French people.

It is also said, that if peace is made before a counter-revolution is effected in France, the Christian religion is lost (*a*). No Christian can be of this opinion; for upon the
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a The fears of Mr. Grattan, a leading member of the Irish House of Commons, carry him still further: he trembles for the safety of the God-head. If there was not too much blasphemy in his language on the subject
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authority which supports the religion itself, the honor of Providence is pledged for its eternal protection, and it cannot therefore be destroyed by any human power.

But what new force, what new arguments have the enemies of this religion acquired by the French revolution? Will the declamations of Robespierre, and the coarse and disgusting blasphemy of Dupont, have more effect in shaking our faith, than the refined logic of Hume, the wit and satire of Voltaire, the animated eloquence of Helvetius, the insinuating sophistries of Gibbon, and the fire of Rousseau?

Many of these men, notwithstanding their infidelity, were ornaments to human nature by their moral conduct, which would impress their tenets upon the multitude with additional force. Have the modern French infidels practised since the revolution such purity of morals as to compensate for their deficiency of new arguments? Will the example of their conduct be able to convert those upon whom their reasonings and declamations have no effect? Is there any thing so fascinating in the massacres of the second and third of Sept^r. the atrocities of Carrier at Nantes, of Collot d'Herbois at Lyons, Robespierre at Paris, and the brother of this monster in human form at Toulon, as to make us renounce a religion to which we have hitherto zealously adhered, in spite of all the learning, talents, ingenuity, and industry that have been exerted to injure it in

not to excite indignation, its extravagance would render it highly ludicrous. Let the critics of Homer forbear their censure, when that poet makes Diomed wound Venus, and send her howling from the field of battle; the idea of a Grecian king contending with an inferior deity is piety and moderation, compared with Mr. Grattan's supposition that the French Sans Culottes may subvert the throne of the Almighty.

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our understanding and affections? On the contrary, their crimes may be used as an argument in its support. The humane persons who think that too much blood cannot be shed in the cause of religion ought to pray that more massacres may be perpetrated, more infants and females murdered in France, to give them farther opportunities of representing the horrid effects which they may impute to the infidelity of the French.

It is the example of the crimes of hypocrites that is really injurious to Christianity. The Empress of Russia returning thanks to Heaven for the murder of twenty thousand of the inhabitants of Poland, and attempting to sanction all her crimes with the authority of religion, are circumstances more likely to disgust unsteady believers, than all the massacres that have ever been committed by deists and atheists.

How can they who believe in the agency of a particular Providence, which is an article in the creed of the Church of England, continue to think that the present war is a just war in the cause of religion, since the event of it has been so eminently disastrous? If ever the Almighty condescends to interfere in the concerns of men, it would certainly be to give favour and assistance to those who risk every thing to maintain his honour.

There can be but few who think the advocates of the war in earnest, when they speak of their apprehensions for the safety of Christianity, and when they assert that they are contending for the support of that religion whose precepts are violated by almost every measure they pursue. If our legislators wish us to believe that their discourses concerning religion and morality are serious, and that they do not knowingly commit a dreadful mockery of Heaven, when they appear to pray for its aid, let them, instead of
squandering

squandering the public wealth to destroy the people of other countries, apply a portion of it to feed our own, let the sums of money which they so liberally grant to support the rapacious prodigality of a few individuals, be given to alleviate the wretchedness of thousands; let them abolish that execrable commerce that desolates one continent and accumulates misery in another: let them repeal those laws that make religion the pretext of political monopoly and render it odious by connecting it with tyranny and insolence; let them put an end to the havoc and desolation they have occasioned throughout the world by continuing this war so long.

It is not uncommon to hear persons who support the war, lament its consequences and deplore the calamities produced by their own conduct. Perhaps if they were eye witnesses of them, they would not be so far steeled against humanity and sympathy, as to wish for their continuance. But let them remember that these calamities, though remote and unseen, are as real and as bitter as if they beheld them, and that their pity is but a weak palliation of their crime, and a poor recompence to those who perish in the ruins of burned cities, or to those who lose all their comforts and all their means of subsistence in the devastations occasioned by warfare.

Every order of persons would be immediately benefited by peace; for it would immediately increase the value of almost every species of property and the price of every kind of labour, whether employed for use or ornament; because the demand for it and the ability to pay for it would be increased. On the contrary the value of almost every species of property, particularly what depends upon opinion and upon the prosperity of the country, such as property

property in the funds, in canals, in houses in the metropolis, in shipping, and in the colonies; and the price of every kind of labour, particularly the ornamental kinds, are diminished in some measure every day that the war continues.

There is no class of his majesty's subjects more deeply interested in the establishment of peace than the learned, reverend, honourable and noble personages who compose the majority in both houses of parliament. Besides their places and pensions, which it may still be possible to preserve by good management and timely conversion, they have other stakes of considerable magnitude in the country, and as they are regarded by the people as the authors of the war, and therefore, of the calamities arising from it, they would be the first victims to the vengeance of the people if these calamities should increase so much as to rouse their long dormant fury.

With respect to the propriety of making peace at this time, there cannot be two opinions among unbiassed men. The enemy declare that they are desirous of peace; the neutrality of Prussia takes away all hope of recovering Holland; Austria, the Italian powers and Spain are on the eve of withdrawing from the contest and leaving us to sustain, unaided, the whole force and fury of France; Ireland is convulsed by the oppressive and insulting measures of administration; our colonies in the West Indies are distracted by the attacks of the enemy and by insurrections among the slaves; even Great Britain is threatened with famine; tumults of the most dangerous kind, because assisted by the military, here already happened in different parts of the country in consequence of the high price

price of provisions.—Are these the circumstances in which it is prudent for England to contend with such a power as the republic of France?

It is high time for the people to awake from their lethargy and to endeavour by an immediate and vigorous exertion of their constitutional rights to save their constitution and their country from impending ruin. Their opinion expressed in strong remonstrances to their representatives in parliament, and in humble petitions laid at the foot of the throne will be respected, and must in the end be effectual. Let them require above all things the dismissal of that administration whose accursed avarice and love of power have brought the country into its present state, and whose principles and character will prevent it from enjoying permanent tranquillity, if it be governed by them.—Who are we to look to, to supply their place? Perhaps there is no man in England whose talents, experience in the affairs of government, eloquence and popularity render him so fit to extricate the country out of its perilous embarrassment as Mr. Fox. His open and determined character, and his well known attachment to liberty, would incline the enemy to agree to terms more advantageous to the country than if it were directed by any other person. They will remember that it was he who, without hesitating or temporising, boldly opposed the popular delusion previous to the commencement of the war, maintained the right of the French to regulate their government as they pleased, and struggled to the last to prevent hostilities by negotiation. The illustrious person whose dislike to this great man has so long prevented the people from enjoying the full advantage they might derive from his abilities, would do well to forget, or least suspend his enmity for the sake of his interest.

interest. He would lose more by the ruin, and make more by the preservation of the country, than any gentleman in it.

If the people do not exert themselves at this momentous crisis ; if they remain silent and patient under all that assails and threatens them ; they will deserve all the consequences of their stupidity and pusillanimity: they will soon curse themselves for their own folly and weakness ; they will be the eternal curse of their own posterity, and the scorn of the whole world.

May, 25, 1795.

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

ERRATA.

- Page 9, line 25, for thirty-six, read thirty.
 — 10, — 25, for basis, read bases.
 — 11, — 10, for event, read events.
 — 13, — 8, for exists, read exist.
 — 17, — 14, for would, read should.
 — 17, — 20, for species, read specie.
 — 27, — 14, for this, read their.
 — 29, — 16, for was, read were.
 — 31, — 2, for has, read have.
 — 33, — 4, for vigorous, read rigorous.
 — 33, — 11, erase the word *not*.
 — 34, — 2, for department, read departments.
 — 37, — 18, for artifices, read artificers.
 — 42, — 33, for attempted, read attempt.
 — 48, — 6, for representations, read representatives.
 — 50, — 8, for has been made, read has been universally
 made.
 — 52, last line, for is, read are.
 — 54, — 23 for imperscriptible, read imprescriptible.
 — 55, — 15, for sect, read religion.
 — 63, — 19, for that it may be attempted, read but that
 it may be attempted.
 — 64, — 16, for their existence, read its existence.
 — 65, — 18, for circumstance, read circumstances.
 — 72, — 28, erase the word *possibly*.
 — 74, — 22, for violated, read vitiated.
 — 76, — 17, for fame, read fortunes.
 — 76, — 18, erase the words, *in the power and*.
 — 77, — 27, for continues, read continued.



